IHC stays Mumtaz Qadri's death penalty - Tue, Jun 19, 2012

Source: http://www.thenews.com.pk/NewsDetail.aspx?ID=24347&title=Islamabad-High-Court-stays-Mumtaz-Qadris-death-penalty



 
ISLAMABAD: Islamabad High Court has stayed the implementation on Mumtaz Qadri's death orders Tuesday, Geo News reported. He was accused in assassinating former Punjab governor Salman Taseer.

According to sources, the hearing of the appeal against the death sentence to Qadri was heard by a two-member bench led by Chief Justice of Islamabad High Court Iqbal Hameed-ur-Rehman.

Former Chief Justice, Lahore High Court, Khawaja Muhammad Sharif is leading the panel of lawyers defending Mumtaz Qadri in the appeal which he filed against his conviction for killing former Governor Punjab Salman Taseer in Islamabad High Court.

Mumtaz Qadri was sentenced to two-time death and Rs100,000 fine by the Anti-Terrorism Court, Rawalpindi on October 1st.
 

State honour - Part II - Chris Cork Tuesday, June 19, 2012

Source: http://www.thenews.com.pk/Todays-News-9-115408-State-honour---Part-II


 
In recent years, as honour killings have occurred in western cultures there has begun to be an exploration of the psychology behind them, and herein may lie some clues as to the sense of national honour, the honour of the nation state. Honour killings appear to be linked to a form of ‘status anxiety’; the fear of losing status in the eyes of the family and the wider community. There is a pathological sense of insecurity coupled with an incessant pressure on family members to conform to social conventions as encapsulated by the honour codes. The fear is that ‘face’ will be lost and losing face triggers ostracism by the community. There is also a linkage to the perception of social identity, the need to feel that one ‘belongs’ in some way and that loss of that sense is socially disabling.

Male domination coupled with a low perception of female status also has a close correlation to the incidence of honour killing. Cultures where females are less valued are more likely to sanction their killing. Cultures with a high incidence of honour killing such as India and Pakistan also have high incidences of female foeticide and infanticide. Currently this is reaching epidemic levels in India and there are anecdotal but increasing reports of a sharp rise of female foeticide in Pakistan as the gender of unborns is increasingly made known to parents.

There is also a clear correlation between cultures that are sexually repressive and honour killing. It appears that the majority of honour killings are the result of and a punishment for a completely natural human instinct – the desire to interact with the opposite gender, to fall in love. The ‘crime’ may to be to fall in love with a member of a different caste or with somebody outside the selection-circle of arranged marriage. Honour killings have their greatest incidence in patriarchal societies that have high levels of sexual repression coupled with a neurotically anathemous set of attitudes towards the human body and human sexuality. Culture overrides instinct, is negatively reinforced as an acceptable indeed desirable normative value, and lives are forfeit.

Humans are not necessarily rational, fair, decent, honest or good. Few are wholly good and equally few are wholly bad. Honour killing is a pathological behavior which has prehistoric origins and is closely linked to a sense of vulnerability, of threat from ‘the other’ and a need for belonging and status that overrides rational behavior and sanctions a gross aberration. The only way in which cultures can right themselves from this deviant position is by developing a greater sense of stability, losing the intense sense of paranoia that feeds into the ‘victimhood’ which is ostracism and a mature sense of self both as an individual and as a member of the wider population – the state. Can we ‘read across’ the psychopathology of honour killing at the individual and family level as outlined above to an understanding of honour in the context of the state? A cautious ‘possibly’ would be the response of the author.

Firstly there is a disjunction between the honour of the state and the honour of the individual who kills another by reason of honour. The honour of the state is virtually by definition a political expression in the context of international relations, whereas the murder of a relative is intensely personal, a micro-event. It is preposterous to suggest that the honour of Pakistan is so besmirched by America failing to apologise for an incident about which little is clear-cut, and much is disputed even after exhaustive investigation – that it would ‘kill’ America. It is less preposterous to imagine that the state is so slighted by the failure to apologise that it harbours the instinctive desires and thoughts that go with a wish to kill that which has done the dishonouring – but coupled at a state level with the intense frustration of being unable to follow-through on the culturally desirable option.

At an even more abstract level there is the question of whether the state is itself gendered – a motherland – and if feminine then the state carries the honour of the nation-family which has in this instance been believed besmirched.

Again within the context of familial perception coupled to statehood has Pakistan lost face in the eyes of the wider family of, in this case, Muslim nations? Once again a cautious ‘possibly’, if only because Pakistan is still far from having a developed sense of a singular identity, has a powerful sense of victimhood stretching back almost to Partition and is assailed on all sides by ‘the other’ which finds expression in the paranoia of ultranationalism and extremism.

As a Muslim state emerging in the 20th century Pakistan might imagine itself as having a kind of primacy, or at least some seniority, in the family of Muslim nations. To be seen to have been treated not once but many times over decades in a way that is dishonouring by a powerful hegemon, America, adds layer upon layer to the sense of humiliation that eventually accretes to an internalised anger that has no outlet and the state begins to feed on its own frustrations. There is thus a sense of weakness, of an inability to uphold the values of honour and discharge the responsibilities that go with the honour of the state, and that perception again feeds into the internal conflicts of the ‘family’ that is a forever-fractious Pakistan.

Other factors – the profound patriarchy and the sexually repressed nature of Pakistani culture – have little relevance in the paradigm of state dishonour but it is possible to at least get a hazy grasp of how and why Pakistan at the macro, the state level, perceives and feels dishonour. It would be unwise to try and make an exact fit between the factors that underlie honour killing and the honour of the state, but it is apparent that there is at least some congruity. In particular it is the acute experience of being disrespected, of not being valued in a way that is perceived as sincere and most specifically the frustration at not being able to make a response that satisfies cultural imperatives. The sense that the only way of righting the wrong is to kill that which has brought dishonour to your house.

An understanding of the complex psychosocial make-up of the honour construct is an essential part of doing business with Pakistan – or indeed any other state where ‘honour’ is a quality in the ascendant as much as it is on the wane in the west. This is not to say that the west is inherently dishonourable, merely that it has a differential understanding of honour and a set of social and societal values and constructs that are a poor fit towards the east. Honour, like democracy, is not a one-size-fits-all garment, and the honour and dignity of Pakistan when viewed through an analytical prism has indeed been besmirched within the context of a national value-construct. An apology for Salala may ease the unease, but time invested in a closer understanding of how Pakistan experiences itself would yield even greater benefits.

Concluded

The writer is a British social worker settled in Pakistan. Email: manticore73@ gmail.com

A region in transition - Shamshad Ahmad Tuesday, June 19, 2012

Source: http://www.thenews.com.pk/Todays-News-9-115406-A-region-in-transition


 
 
The post-9/11 world has seen an unprecedented change in the nature and gravity of its problems. While countries and nations have been able to move away from the bitter antagonisms of the past to embrace peace, Asia’s major regions continue to be a global hotspot. The long-standing Asian issues include the Palestine question, Kashmir, the tensions on the Korean Peninsula and across the Strait of Taiwan and the triangular relations among Japan, the US and China, or in an expanded regional context, pentagonal relations among these three powers, plus Russia and India.

The post-Cold War unipolarity has also created a serious imbalance of global power. The concept of collective security and acceptance of moral and legal imperatives enshrined in the UN Charter are no longer the basis of the world order today. Historical grievances and outstanding disputes continue to be unaddressed. Economic adventurism of the 19th century is back. What aggravates this scenario is the growing inability of the international community to respond to these challenges with unity of purpose.

The ramifications of endless tensions and instability in some parts of Asia for global peace and security are immense. Some of the sources of these tensions and conflicts in Asia include America’s yet-to-end war in Afghanistan and its continuing power-play in Central Asia, the Indo-US military and nuclear nexus with its destabilising effect on the prospects of peace in South Asia, the continuing Iranian nuclear crisis, North Korea’s worrisome nuclear and ICBM capability, the deadlocked six-party talks on this issue, and other unresolved territorial disputes in the region, including those between Japan and Russia, China and South Korea.

In this murky scenario, China represents Asia’s only ray of hope. As a pillar of strength for the world community, China is already playing an important role not only for the maintenance of international peace and security but also in averting any major global economic crises. Since the end of the Cold War, there has been a discernible change in China’s foreign policy which, based on the principle of peaceful coexistence, has had an important effect on modern international relations. Globally, China is today a major stabilising force in the world’s economic and fiscal system and also an effective, stabilising player in the UN Security Council.

Guided by its long-term politico-economic interests, China has been following pragmatic policies in seeking improvement of its relations with the US and other advanced countries, as well as with India. On its differences or disputes with some of its neighbours, China’s policy is that they should be “appropriately managed and resolved through dialogue and consultation based on realities and in accordance with the basic norms governing international relations.” It has peacefully addressed its border issues with Russia and is engaged in creating a friendly neighbourhood with other adjacent countries.

But China has its own regional and global concerns and is not oblivious of the challenges resulting from the US-led new unipolarity or its ascendency in Asian regions. No wonder, in recent years, there has been a conspicuous development of closeness between China and Russia in reaction to what they perceive as growing US strategic outreach in their backyard. They especially share an interest in curbing Washington’s influence in strategically important and resource-rich Central Asia.

This year’s Shanghai Cooperation Organisation Summit in Beijing earlier this month clearly flagged a mood swing in Asia’s heartlands referring to the growing number of hotbeds in different regions by calling for the intensification of the SCO efforts to strengthen regional security and to jointly counter the global challenges. Indeed, China and Russia are bound together in this organisation by their common geo-strategic and economic interests in the region, their mutual concern over the increasing US hegemony and their eagerness to promote a multipolar world.

One should not forget that their main common worry has been the growing fear of Islamic fundamentalism and radical influences seeping out of this region and inflaming their discontented populations. According to President Nazarbaev of Kazakhstan, “the cradle of terrorism, separatism and extremism is the instability in Afghanistan.” This threat is no less worrisome to China and Russia. Both have been concerned over the persistent instability in the region and the resultant trends of terrorism, separation and extremism.

It is therefore understandable that despite its members’ professed intention to address “a full range of international issues,” the SCO’s focus remains firmly on their immediate concerns, regional security issues in general and Islamic extremism in particular. It is also natural that as main powers of the region, Russia and China would have vital interest in the region’s energy resources and its potential as a market and investment outlet. In this context, they have given the SCO a typical regional security dimension focused essentially on intra-regional threats to their own territorial integrity.

Defence and security cooperation is already an important part of the SCO agenda. In April this year, Russia and China conducted a joint naval exercise Sea Cooperation 2012 in the Yellow Sea, following four bilateral military exercises since 2005. The armed forces of the SCO member states held a joint “Peace Mission Drill” in Tajikistan earlier this month involving more than 2,000 servicemen from China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. The scenario envisaged joining forces in an anti-terrorist operation in mountainous areas against the background of a regional crisis caused by terrorist activities.

During President Putin’s recent state visit to Beijing preceding the SCO summit, Russia and China found common language in foreign affairs and undertook to cooperate to ensure security in the Asia Pacific region. In this context both countries vowed to expand military cooperation in the form of closer relations between their defence ministries and joint military and naval exercises. Moscow is reported to be working on an ambitious plan for modernisation of its military capabilities by 2015. China is also building up its naval capabilities. Both countries are already increasing their mutual trade. In the coming years, China could become a major buyer of Russia’s military hardware and energy resources.

In the context of Afghanistan, both China and Russia, like us, want early restoration of peace in that war-ravaged country free of foreign influence or domination. But they are more concerned over what they see as forces of “extremism, terrorism and separatism” emanating from this region as a conduit of destabilisation in their own territories. In fact, the very rationale for the establishment of SCO in the 90s was to forestall these very forces. To an extent, this creates a convergence of interests in the long-terms objectives of the SCO and NATO countries. This part of Asia is certainly in transition, but any assumptions of the SCO emerging as a regional security bloc at this stage would be too far-fetched.

Against this backdrop, China and Pakistan will have to explore new avenues of reinforcing their strategic relationship through further expansion in their multi-dimensional bilateral collaboration, including in areas of defence equipment, high-tech heavy industry and the energy sector, as well as in developing communication and energy infrastructure. Pakistan, as a crucial player in the Afghan endgame, must focus on a new regional approach that secures Afghanistan’s independence and neutrality through a UN-led peace process.

With impending US withdrawal from Afghanistan, Pakistan could also play an important role in bringing ECO and SCO together in terms of closer inter-regional cooperation between the two organisations, which have a tremendous overlap in terms of common membership and huge combined economic potential which if exploited properly could transform this part of Asia into an economic powerhouse besides making it a major factor of regional and global stability.

The writer is a former foreign secretary. Email: shamshad1941@ yahoo.com

Why the ice didn’t melt - Dr Maleeha Lodhi Tuesday, June 19, 2012

Source: http://www.thenews.com.pk/Todays-News-9-115405-Why-the-ice-didn%E2%80%99t-melt


From Print Edition
 
 
The writer is special adviser to the Jang Group/Geo and a former envoy to the US and the UK.

The anodyne joint statement said it all. No progress was made on the Siachen dispute in last week’s talks between the defence officials of Pakistan and India. The only agreement indicated by the statement issued at the conclusion of the talks was for officials to meet again. The June 11-12 defence secretaries’ talks also failed to advance discussion of what should be a non-contentious aspect of Siachen – the environmental degradation being caused by military activity on the glacier.

The thirteenth round of talks on the 28-year old dispute turned out to be a virtual replay of the previous round of May 2011. Both sides restated their well-rehearsed positions. The main obstacle remained India’s insistence that before demilitarisation Pakistan should agree on authentication of present troop positions and demarcation of the Actual Ground Position Line (AGPL). The Indian delegation also dismissed Pakistan’s non-paper handed over last year as containing “nothing new”.

This unedifying outcome was foretold well before the talks by statements from top Indian leaders in the weeks and days leading up to the negotiations. Some of these were prompted by public remarks made by Pakistan’s army chief General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani in April when he visited Gayari sector after the avalanche tragedy that claimed the lives of 139 soldiers and civilians. He called for demilitarisation of the Siachen glacier and “peaceful resolution” of all disputes between Pakistan and India.

This evoked a lively media debate in both countries. But it drew a tepid response from Delhi. India’s junior Defence Minister Pallam Raju avoided comment on the need to resolve the dispute making only a perfunctory statement about the challenge of maintaining troops on the glacier. More significantly Defence Minister AK Antony told the Rajya Sabha that authentication of present (Indian) troop positions was a pre-requisite for any progress in negotiations.

India’s chief of army staff, VK Singh went further. In an interview he cast General Kayani’s call for a peaceful resolution as “nothing new”, ruled out any pullback by the Indian army from Siachen, and gratuitously added “all of Jammu and Kashmir belongs to India”. He also made light of the hope expressed by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh when he visited Siachen some years ago to make the glacier “a mountain of peace”. “We should not”, said General Singh, “succumb to these bouts of thinking about peace mountains”.

Meanwhile a flood of articles in the Indian press ahead of the Rawalpindi talks urged Delhi not ‘give away’ India’s hard won military gains on the negotiating table. A common refrain of many in India’s strategic community was that if India did not retain the Saltoro ridge, a ‘Pakistan-China axis’ would bring the Karakorum Pass under its control and jeopardise the security of Ladakh.

Minister Antony declared on the eve of the talks not to “expect (any) dramatic announcement or decision on an issue which is very important for (our) national security.” A day before, a meeting of India’s cabinet committee on security apparently decided – and then leaked to the media – that Delhi would not give up its tactical and strategic advantage in the glacier area.

This was a repeat of what preceded last year’s talks. On the eve of the twelfth round India’s top national security official told Pakistan’s High Commissioner in Delhi not to “expect anything” from the parleys.

In this unpromising backdrop, two days of talks in Rawalpindi went according to the script. Pakistan’s effort to elicit an Indian response to the constructive ideas contained in its 2011 non-paper came to naught. The Indian delegation saw nothing in these proposals to provide a basis to move forward.

In the non-paper, Islamabad had reiterated the principles for a settlement agreed to by the two countries in 1989 – redeployment outside the zone of conflict, a monitoring and verification mechanism to be determined by military experts, and demarcation of the Line of Control beyond NJ 9842 thereafter. In an important demonstration of flexibility Pakistan also offered that when a schedule of withdrawal was drawn up it could consist of lists of both “present” and “future” positions. This would be subject to the stipulation that these would exclusively be for monitoring purposes and not to stake any moral or legal claim at the time of a final settlement of the dispute.

The Indian side rejected this, offered no new ideas, and reiterated its familiar position of authentication and demarcation of present positions on the ground and on the map, with demilitarisation and “future positions” to follow later.

To bridge differences on sequencing the steps needed for demilitarisation and address India’s how-can-we-trust-you argument, the Pakistani delegation suggested that agreed steps could be undertaken simultaneously. But the Indian side refused to budge from its position.

When Pakistani negotiators said a solution to Siachen was important for peace and security in South Asia, this was met by the familiar Indian argument that Delhi had larger concerns beyond South Asia -an obvious reference to China.

The Pakistani delegation’s effort to engage the Indian side in a discussion on environmental degradation due to human activity on the glacier elicited no response. The Indian side declined to accept that any degradation was in progress and instead referred to reports suggesting there had been no negative environmental impact. It was also unwilling to include any reference to this issue in the joint statement or to pursue further discussions on this.

Pakistan’s desire for a speedy solution was conveyed by the proposal to convene another round of talks quickly without waiting for another year to go by. This too got little traction. The Indian emphasis was on first creating an environment of trust and confidence before looking for solutions to disputes, an echo of its characteristic position in previous rounds. In this context the Indian delegation emphasised instituting new CBMs including visits between military institutions and exchange of military bands. The Pakistani side read this as sidestepping the real issue.

With no progress accomplished in the thirteenth round and little prospect of Delhi showing the flexibility needed to overcome the impasse, the dialogue on Siachen has increasingly become more about process than outcome.

Among the broader signals sent by the Indian stance three are noteworthy. One, India wants normalisation of relations between the two countries to proceed only in areas on its priority list – trade, people-to-people contact, economic and cultural ties, and not resolution of long-standing disputes, which top Pakistan’s priorities. Two, little or no progress can be expected in the dialogue on various disputes because – for now – Delhi perceives no need to make compromises. With diminished interest by the international community to nudge Delhi in this direction and the US wooing India in its strategic aim to contain China, Delhi sees no pressure or incentive to show the accommodation needed to settle disputes with Pakistan.

Three, emphasising confidence building measures enables Delhi to postpone or deflect addressing the substance of disputes and even serve as an alibi to avoid finding solutions to disputes. It is interesting to note in this regard that while India ‘trusts’ Pakistan enough to open up and expand trade, that trust evaporates when it comes to addressing outstanding disputes.

The key question this raises is whether Pakistan-India normalisation can be sustainable without solving the disputes that lie at the root of long-standing tensions? Surely a diplomatic dance around the real issues – with a focus on process not progress – can hardly establish the basis for enduring peace.

VIEW : Army operation in South Waziristan: the TTP and IDPs — Muhammad Zubair - Tuesday, June 19, 2012

Source: http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2012\06\19\story_19-6-2012_pg3_4
The Mehsud IDPs of SWA are bitterly frustrated and complain of being the only victims of the military operations as none resulted in the elimination of the TTP

The Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) has reportedly issued a warning to the residents of the Mehsud areas of South Waziristan Agency (SWA) to vacate their houses. The recent warning does not stand alone, but is part of a series of such warnings issued by the TTP to the Mehsud internally displaced persons (IDPs) from time to time since the October 2009 military operations in the said area. The warning, as reported, is misleading in that it gives an impression as if the tribesmen occupy the entire Mehsud area of SWA and that they are being asked by the TTP to vacate it. In fact, the TTP’s warning is addressed to those IDPs who have already repatriated to areas designated by the military authorities as safe and they constitute less than 10 percent of the total Mehsud IDPs. It also addressed those who are still living as IDPs in settled districts but wish to return. A majority of them are living in the settled districts of Tank and D I Khan.

It was in anticipation of the October 2009 military operations that Mehsud tribesmen of SWA were evicted from their homes, for the last time, and relocated to settled districts as IDPs. However, it was not the only time as they were displaced from their areas quite a few times because of different operations launched by the army in SWA from time to time since 2005.

The irony is that the 2009 military operation in SWA, as the earlier ones, resulted in nothing but turning thousands of houses and hundreds of villages into rubble. The heavy artillery of the military and bombing of jets pounded the empty civilian dwellings incessantly until they were obliterated from the face of earth. In the last three years, the forces of nature have destroyed the rest of a few empty human dwellings that had survived the military operation. Since the media does not have access to the area, no one knows the scale of devastation and destruction of infrastructure. However, one can observe it on the Google Earth imagery, if one is familiar with the terrain.

The Mehsud IDPs of SWA are bitterly frustrated and complain of being the only victims of the military operations as none resulted in the elimination of the TTP, not even a single terrorist worth the name. They suffered an irreparable loss by becoming IDPs for the last three years and destruction of their houses, villages and belongings. The IDPs also allege that militants were given safe passage to North Waziristan before the 2009 bombing in order to mislead the US and world community that Pakistan is ‘doing more’. Every IDP of SWA is convinced, rightly or wrongly but vehemently, that the army and militants are two sides of the same coin. Their confidence in the army is shattered because of what they have witnessed in the last so many years and consider it as part of the problem rather than part of the solution.

The TTP had started warning the Mehsud IDPs against returning to their areas since the announcement of repatriation to SWA by the army in late 2010. The plan was to register families belonging to the Spinkai Raghzai, Servekai, Shahur and other adjoining areas in SWA designated by the army as safe and which constituted less than 10 percent of SWA. Each family was to be compensated with Rs 25,000, given six months’ food rations and other kitchen utensils and provided the facility of shifting the families to these areas. The families were supposed to live in official camps established by the Pakistan army, as their homes did not exist anymore. The repatriation plan was delayed until the summer of 2012 because people were not ready to return to SWA in a situation where the TTP having survived the operation remained intact, and was hurling threats of horrible consequences at the tribesmen who wished to return to their areas.

In order to win the confidence of the returning IDPs, obtain their willingness to return and ensure their safety from the TTP once they had repatriated, the military authorities came up with the idea of outsourcing the task to another group of militants called the Abdullah Mehsud Group (AMG), which had a long-standing enmity with the TTP leadership. It was hoped the AMG would be able to do the job and take the TTP head on. The AMG was the same group that had enjoyed official patronage and helped the military authorities in breaking the hold of the TTP on the settled districts of Tank and D I Khan. However, the military authorities had bet on a wrong horse and the AMG utterly failed in what was expected of it.

A number of jirgas followed between the Mehsud tribal elders and government and military authorities. The object was to sort out the modalities of repatriation and addressing the misgivings of Mehsud IDPs about security against the TTP, and food and shelter once they had returned. One such tribal elder Malik Sardar Amanuddin Shamankhel was the lead negotiator who took upon himself the responsibility of mobilising the Mehsud IDPs for repatriation in return for some guarantees from the military authorities. Mysteriously, he went missing from the military camp in Wana in January 2011 and his bullet-riddled and beheaded body was found after two months in Wana.

It is only in the summer of 2012 that the utterly destitute Mehsud IDPs, constituting less than 10 percent of the total Mehsud IDPs, have started repatriating to the camps established by the army in designated areas of SWA.

The military had declared the 2009 operation as a success but the recent warning of the TTP speaks volumes about the so-called success. The fact of the matter is that 90 percent of the Mehsud areas of SWA are still inaccessible, including Makin, Ladha, Kaniguram, Shaga, Chalveshtai, Mizhboz, Mantio, Nano, Karama, Wospass and other adjoining areas. Only the military and the TTP have access to these areas, where they are living side by side in peace. Turning insurgency-infected areas into ghost towns cannot be termed a successful operation by any stretch of the imagination.

The writer is an assistant professor of Law at the University of Peshawar, Pakistan. Presently, he is a PhD scholar at the Maurer School of Law, Indiana University, Indiana, USA and can be reached at zubairfata@yahoo.com and mzubair@indiana.edu

EDITORIAL : A self-inflicted debacle - Tuesday, June 19, 2012

Source: http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2012\06\19\story_19-6-2012_pg3_1

EDITORIAL : A self-inflicted debacle
Another energy conference is planned for today. Another Rs 8 billion has been released to PEPCO for distribution to fuel-starved powerhouses. Another order is issued to the Ministries of Power Petroleum and Finance by the president to bottle the genie gone berserk in the shape of a severe power shortage rising to 8,500 MW and largely affecting Punjab and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. There is nothing new in the steps taken so far by the government to overcome the power crisis that has compelled the suffering people to come out on the roads and in their frustration and anger attack government buildings and the houses of sitting MNAs. Terming the violence as being backed by the PML-N does not absolve the government of its mismanagement, policy failure and botched up planning. Similarly, it is no longer possible to blame the failures of the previous government to escape responsibility for the worsening mess. Four years should have been enough, if not to completely eliminate then at least bring the power crisis down substantially. According to an estimate, nearly Rs 12 million worth of losses have been incurred in a day due to the violence that saw people attacking banks, WAPDA offices, police stations, petrol stations and public and government vehicles. Joining the bandwagon, the All Pakistan Traders Association has announced a nationwide campaign and strikes from June 23 if load shedding continues at its present level. The attack in Khanewal on the house of an Advisor to the prime minister and in Chichawatni on the house of a sitting PPP MNA is sending a message that the government is losing its grip. This is not a good omen for it, especially in an election year.

Not surprisingly, the government has been trying different options to handle the power issue. Naveed Qamar, the former minister for power, was shown the door for his inability to deal with the crisis. Though it is too early to expect any wonders from the new minister, Ahmed Mukhtar, probably still adjusting to his new role, the argument that even a layman knows what ails the power sector, in any case calls for swift action. It is the shortage of fuel that has restricted generation by the powerhouses. The money needed to buy sufficient fuel is not available. Circular debt, as is well known, is a web that has tangled up the power generating houses so badly that sporadic injections of funds have failed to overcome it. Six powerhouses are completely shut down. Hubco and Kapco are generating half their capacity, 15 grid stations are not working. According to official estimates, the power sector needs around Rs 3 billion a day to buy fuel. Unfortunately, it is collecting only Rs one billion from consumers. Distribution companies have failed to meet government-set targets of recovery by 50 percent. Power theft adds its own contribution to the power shortage.

This crisis is a self-inflicted debacle. It is a policy failure. When the Supreme Court took up the Rental Power Plant case, the verdict mentioned absence of policy in cutting such a flawed deal. The question has arisen: who heads the power sector? Despite the prime minister’s directive to supply 207 million cubic feet gas a day to the power sector, the SNGPL and SSGPL express their inability to do so since they do not have the gas. How can such an important sector be subjected to such ad hoc decisions? The government has to come out of its fire-fighting mode, make a plan and then adhere to it. The exodus of foreign investment and the dwindling of domestic industry and commerce primarily because of the power crisis could lead the country to a serious economic meltdown.*

SECOND EDITORIAL : Goodbye Fauzia Wahab 

Ms Fauzia Wahab’s passing away on Sunday in Karachi has evoked shock and sorrow from the PPP as well as across the political divide and from society at large. Her sudden and shocking demise because of post-operative complications has raised many questions about the care she received in her last days. Ms Wahab leaves a husband and four children, to whom we can only extend our condolences. Along with a rich legacy of social and political activism, Ms Wahab will be remembered as one of the PPP’s most outspoken spokespersons. Being part of Pakistan’s biggest political party with the largest women’s representation, the 56-year-old Ms Wahab rose to prominence due to her advocacy of human rights, and an avid yet rational voice of the party. Following the manifesto of the original founders of the PPP, her main focus always remained the deprived. Her first entry in politics came during her studies in the early and mid-1970s. Ms Wahab joined the PPP during Benazir Bhutto’s first tenure. She later served as the Information secretary of the party in Sindh. Working in close liaison with Benazir, she was later elected an MNA. She was appointed central information secratary of the party during the PPP’s present tenure, a role she fulfilled with dedication and distinction. Ms Wahab’s name became synonymous with devoted, passionate and loyal adherence to her party’s policies and the vocalisation of that on numerous TV shows where she became a regular presence. Invoking strong sentiments in her audience, there was no one — her admirers or critics — who remained immune to her oratorical prowess. The PPP and all those she fought for — the minorities, the persecuted and the downtrodden — will remember her for her unwavering focus and dedication to her party and her causes.

As her well-wishers and many amongst the general public call for a proper medical investigation into the post-surgical complications leading to her slipping into a coma, resulting in her premature death, it will bring into focus the less than satisfactory medical care in the country. In the meantime, let us all unite to bid adieu to one of those few Pakistani women who dared to live according to her principles and made a significant mark in whichever field she touched. *

Leaders and mere emperors - Asha’ar Rehman - 19-6-2012

Source: http://dawn.com/2012/06/19/leaders-and-mere-emperors/

OF all the names the one that hurt most last week was when I was called an “amused spectator”.
The complainant was the producer of a television channel looking for a journalist to speak on the ‘way forward’ for the profession for an evening discussion show.
The not-so-amusing spectator bit was in response to excuses mumbled on telephone. The producer said he would come knocking again, there obviously being no escape from the freedoms that the media is hell-bent on using and bestowing on everyone around.
In cricket I often find my escape from all the madness around. That could not be, in a week which was replete with offerings by all kind of emperors, including a cricketing one.
It was the week when shahanshah-i-ghazal Mehdi Hasan took his final bow, real estate king Malik Riaz sought to play a leader of some sort and in contrast, the bar associations acted as monarchs in banishing unwanted lawyers from their domain and our on-screen opinion leaders acted not just as political parties or political leaders, but as kings who were often bigger than their kingdoms.
Cricket this time did not offer solace or refuge but an explanation in sync with the trends. King Richards summed up the situation, aptly, even if more by default than design. He was angered by the indolence shown to him by a prodder of unfulfilled promise, Denesh Ramdin his name.
Sir Richards had trashed Ramdin, but it so happened the West Indies wicket-keeper went on to score a Test century, of whatever little significance, not long after. And while Ramdin was so overwhelmed by the moment that he flashed a naughty sign at Richards, the emperor hit back, against his own tradition.
Did he have to really? Why did he have to? The answer: Sir Viv is a television commentator.
For long years, Sir Viv went around with the rather unflattering title of the butcher. He expressed with the ferocity of a storm but seldom had to fall back on words to do the talking for him.
Personally, the image that stands out most vividly is the one that captured Richards’ reaction to a defeat by Pakistan in a World Cup game in Lahore in 1987.
Abdul Qadir (sorry folks no pregnant pause followed by Gilani here) had just performed the most incredible, last-over heist on West Indies.
I recall the great man lying on the ground, his maroon cap covering his gaze. Then he got up swiftly, dusted his cap and walked away — with a swagger that did not appear to have been acquired and which could not be taken away by a momentary defeat. This was king-like, really.
Sir Richards had his bad moments. In the most critical of these, he chose to maintain an imperial silence when his captaincy was under attack and he was dubbed as a king who couldn’t quite lead.
It just doesn’t appear right to see the king embrace controversy where he could have communicated better by ignoring the emotional outburst of an ordinary mortal.
This is not all. Through his own sporting parallels Sir Richards deprived an avid admirer of the little comparisons the admirer was working on.
Resorting to football, he talked about how Ramdin’s century amounted to a solitary goal by a team which had already allowed their opponents to score five.
Somewhat similar would be an analogy between some of our television anchors and the haggard and defeated pace bowler who chooses to celebrate his first wicket after going for over 200 runs in an innings.
They have been taken for runs by this government over the last four years and few months. They would be well advised to not over-celebrate when their moment finally comes.
The last week these media moguls spent in offering their own answers to their own invisible Ramdin. Just as a list carrying a score of names of television anchors did the rounds, each and everyone on the list right down to the difficult-to-excite Suhail Warraich considered it proper to answer back.
Not only did they do this, and lent the ‘fake’ list some credibility by doing so, they used their own grand shows built in their own small kingdoms — the channels they work with — to plead their innocence.
This exchange left little room for the timid to join a TV talk show which is a derivation of the stage play where the applause and brickbats come instantly and it is a foregone conclusion as to what will get the claps and what the bricks.
Imagine the ordeal a discussant would subject himself to if he were to, God forbid, state that fake lists and fixed interviews were things not new to Pakistani journalism. Particularly someone as positioned as our real state king would only agree to an interview on certain conditions and the channel would give him the opportunity in pursuance of its own interests.
Aren’t Internet archives full of such interviews where the subject has been asked a series of soft questions in an effort to clear his name? Okay there are some juicy off-the -record bits that have been discovered, but primarily, these reconfirm the already known. The most remarkable clue they offer is when the name Abdul Qadir, this time followed by the Gilani surname, is mentioned.
Was it a loosener? A simple leg-break? Or could it have been a googly that turns the other way, the way of the most corrupt species on the face of the earth, the politician?
Saying this may not be impossible but it is certainly a cross that is becoming rather too heavy to bear before television cameras that work by their own preferences and ethics and demands. What they communicate is painful enough as a spectacle. Wonder what it is like to be in the middle.
The writer is Dawn’s s resident editor in Lahore.