http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2010\08\28\story_28-8-2010_pg3_2
Carried away by this cloying obedience, Bhutto made Zia the commander-in-chief of the armed forces. His elevation as chief of the strongest, most funded and disciplined organ of the state, was somewhat similar to Macbeth’s installation as the Thane of Cawdor
The events surrounding Zia’s debut, draconian dictatorship and death have some stunning similarities with Shakespeare’s Macbeth, portraying the generals’ intrigues that blighted the British Isles in the early centuries of the last millennium. The play known for the splendour of its soliloquies and narrative is set in Scotland, torn by rebellions against the reigning King Duncan, and Macbeth, his confidant general, being sent to contain his archrival, the Thane of Fife. Macbeth, while returning from his victory along with Banquo, another brave general, is encountered by three witches on a heath, who prophesy that Macbeth will be made the Thane of Cawdor and then a monarch and that Banquo will also beget a long line of kings. Entering the capital, Macbeth soon learns that he has been actually proclaimed the Thane of Cawdor. Amazed at this ominous prescience of the witches, he wonders over the fulfilment of their second prophecy and shares these innate thoughts with his wife. King Duncan, meanwhile, visits their palace at Inverness, where Lady Macbeth, anxious to expedite her husband’s ascent to the throne, conspires to kill the king, Macbeth murders the king, manipulating the implication of the drunkard guards of the monarch. Duncan’s princes, however, flee to England.
Macbeth becomes the king but being haunted by the prophecy about the crown slipping to Banquo’s heirs, he has Banquo murdered. His son nonetheless, manages to escape unscathed. Smitten by his guilt and insomnia, Macbeth again approaches the witches and learns that he will not be vanquished until the Birnam Woods come to his Dunsinane Palace and that no man born of a woman can harm him. Bolstered by this, Macbeth unleashes a rule of terror and torture, alienating Macduff, the powerful Thane of Fife, who contacts Duncan’s son Malcolm in England and helps him raise an army. Macbeth, enraged at this impudence, eliminates his entire family. Malcolm, meanwhile, invades Scotland and reaches the Birnam Woods. His soldiers cut branches from the trees to camouflage their assault on Dunsinane. Macbeth, to his despair, finds that the Birnam Woods are indeed coming to his castle. Before being killed by Macduff, he also learns that his slayer was not born the normal way but had been prematurely ripped from his mother’s womb.
In 1977, Pakistan, a land of valiant martial races, like Duncan’s Scotland of gallant highlanders, was torn by a riotous movement of the Pakistan National Alliance (PNA) aimed at Bhutto’s ouster. General Ziaul Haq had contrived to prove himself Bhutto’s most loyal and obsequious lieutenant general. He even stooped to hold Mrs Bhutto’s dog as she alighted from her plane. Just like Macbeth, he was also commanded to contain the 1970s insurgency in Balochistan, and to reinforce the credentials of his feigned loyalty, he pressed for the severest possible punishment to the participants of the Attock Conspiracy and sponsored lavish receptions for the premier. Carried away by this cloying obedience, Bhutto made him the commander-in-chief of the armed forces. His elevation as chief of the strongest, most funded and disciplined organ of the state, was somewhat similar to Macbeth’s installation as the Thane of Cawdor.
Then again, as the PNA protests turned violent, the army was called in and a limited martial law was imposed in some cities. Zia, despite his Machiavellian manipulation, maintained a veneer of devotion and allegiance. Bhutto, already beguiled by Zia’s posture to protect his government, summoned him to brief the cabinet and the PPP and PNA negotiators striving for a settlement.
Zia could thus aptly analyse the stand, strength, and strategies of the contenders, the strains eroding the emaciated embryonic democratic institutions and their susceptibility at this juncture. Two of his predecessors had already struck with impunity, tempting him too for an adventure. But his ambitions certainly were also fired by the lobbies and factions anxious for Bhutto’s nemesis and reminiscent of the three witches mentioned in Macbeth.
The first witch can be compared to the interests of the religious parties and their cognate outfits. Being repeatedly repudiated by the electorate, they preferred a proxy dictator who could implement their version of Islam or at least stem the surge for popular representative institutions. The second was the ravenous spirit of profit and influence of big business, the industrial and commercial magnates and the fledgling traders eager for expansion. Nationalisation had directly affected their power to manipulate the supplies and prices of essential items. So they were determined to support and proffer generous funds to the PNA as its success promised to suppress labour rights and the consumers’ concern for quality, cost, and access.
The third witch, obviously, was the ambitious bureaucracy, trained and tuned to serve as faithful functionaries to rule and control the natives on behalf of their imperial masters. They had inherited a disdain for their lowly compatriots and their representatives and felt more at ease with their congenital khaki breed. Their contempt for commoners had congealed through the elitist institutions, academies, clubs and the perks and privileges far more plump and succulent than those provided to the people who sustained them through their toil and taxes. Any genuinely representative government determined to dismantle this bureaucratic mould and hold had to be deceptively derailed.
The execution of his benefactor by Zia was almost similar to Duncan’s murder by Macbeth. The onus here also lay on the guardians of justice, inebriated with the imperious authority of dictatorship. Equally parallel to the string of macabre assassinations committed by Macbeth were the series of draconian edicts, flogging, hanging and other ghastly punishments inflicted by Zia to prolong his rule.
The meeting of the witches on a heath also has a striking symbolism in Pakistan. A heath as a vast wasteland covered by heather and low shrubs, signifies a soil devoid of political and democratic plantation. It also suggests an arena where conflicting interests and powers were battling like wild winds and rain. The lowly shrubs growing in it similarly imply the incompetence of the PNA leadership to emerge like towering fruitful trees. Banquo being the victim of Macbeth’s brutalities symbolises the democratic enthusiasts ferociously vandalised by Zia. They adored and encouraged Bhutto’s heirs even in exile. The correlation between Macbeth’s death in a seemingly improbable bizarre encounter and Zia’s cremation in an air crash under equally strange circumstances can be compared. Pressing the analogy still further, Duncan’s crown after Macbeth’s slaughter passed on to his son. Bhutto’s mantle, similarly, was retrieved by his daughter.
The writer is an academic and freelance columnist. He can be reached at habibpbu@yahoo.com
Collection of Articles From Different Newspapers and Websites..
POSTCARD USA: Indiana Jones, where’re you? —Khalid Hasan
http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2008\07\06\story_6-7-2008_pg3_3
The advent of the Pakistani TV channels has been a disaster in many ways. You go to any Pakistani home and one or the other of these channels is on. The mullahdom of Pakistan, which has taken to TV as a duck takes to water, now enjoys a trans-Atlantic audience
Short of Indiana Jones materialising in Pakistan, removing the sitting judges of the present Supreme Court and replacing them with the ones General Musharraf sent home last November, there appears little chance of putting the clock back.
Aitzaz Ahsan’s flying visit to Washington and New York seems to have been in vain as Uncle Sam is neither willing to intervene nor actually keen on the old judges coming back. The only comeback kids known in this country are prizefighters and those comebacks happen more in movies than in real life. Remember Rocky.
Every time an American official has been asked about the restoration of the judges deposed by Gen Musharraf in one swift swoop, the answer has been the same. “The US believes in a free judiciary but this is a matter internal to Pakistan and can only be resolved in Pakistan itself.” Translated into simple English, it means: No comebacks.
As for the Pakistanis settled here, they are a spitting image of their countrymen back home. There is little tolerance for the other’s point of view and public display of temper is considered good form, being always in evidence. Arguments are not won by reason but by shouting louder than the opponent. Anyone found in disagreement is declared a traitor and sometimes even beyond the pale of Islam.
There is no dialogue, only declamatory denunciations. Conspiracy theories are not only rampant but fervently believed. It is widely believed that the 9/11 attacks were engineered by a grand international cabal, controlled by Tel Aviv, to give Muslims in general and Arabs in particular a bad name. Why did the twin towers fall on to themselves in a heap, you are asked. If told that engineering studies have established that they fell as they were supposed to fall in such a catastrophic event, you are told, “But of course, that’s what those studies will say. What else would you expect?” I have of course stopped contradicting those who swear that on that day, all the Jews working in the twin towers were told not to turn up. The frequency with which I have heard this may soon induce me to start believing it myself.
The advent of the Pakistani TV channels has been a disaster in many ways. You go to any Pakistani home and one or the other of these channels is on. The mullahdom of Pakistan, which has taken to TV as a duck takes to water, now enjoys a trans-Atlantic audience. On one such programme, I heard a lady in New York ask by phone from a bearded gent in circus-worthy headgear and gown if after taking a shower, it would still be necessary for her to perform ablution for offering namaz. “Most certainly, otherwise you will be in a “na-paak” state.”
All Pakistani TV drama serials, without exception, revolve around marriage and domestic bickering caused by marriages that have either taken place or marriages that have not taken place. I have yet to hear of a serial dedicated to any other theme. In a country as grossly, almost indecently, populated as Pakistan, marriage ought to be discouraged rather than promoted.
But to return to the visits of Aitzaz Ahsan, Ahsan Iqbal and Justice Wajihuddin and their public meetings, it was quite clear that the local PPP cadres were under instructions from party headquarters back home to cause disruption. The way these three were questioned and often interrupted with identically worded questions betrayed the origin of those questions. Local PPP jiyalas attacked the visitors frontally and, in some cases, through newspaper advertisements.
Right in front of me, I have a full-page ad inserted by eight New York PPP men headlined “Judges with dead consciences turned a dictator into a king-maker,” followed by a charge sheet. Highlights: The Supreme Court was guilty of high treason when a democratic government was overthrown in 1999. The dictator’s favourite judges gave him the right to rule at will. That bench included Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry. Why did Chaudhry take oath under a PCO? Let the nation choose between the major and the minor criminal. If Musharraf’s November 2007 judges are illegal, so are those who took oath in October 1999. Did Asif Zardari, Yousaf Raza Gilani and Javed Hashmi, who were in prison for 11, 5 and 4 years respectively receive justice from the courts of Iftikhar Chaudhry and Wajihuddin? We will not permit any conspiracy against our leaders to succeed.
New York is home to several weekly Urdu newspapers, which are distributed free and since they cost nothing, they are picked up from grocery stores and read. But what reading do some of them offer? Here is the second lead from one. The headline informs readers that for the last eight years, the Pakistan government has been in the hands of Qadianis, an ugly conspiracy that has now been unearthed. Shaukat Aziz, Tariq Aziz, former ambassador Gen Durrani and several civil and military officials were involved in that conspiracy. The operations in the tribal areas were launched to crush the Sunni movement and establish control over the ISI and MI. There has been no investment in Pakistan by Europe or America in the last 61 years. Under the patronage of Sehba Musharraf, Citibank senior vice president Junaid Rabbani and other influential figures made contact with the Jewish lobby and Saudi princes. Pakistan was made to borrow heavily from the IMF and the World Bank at exorbitant interest rates, which is why the country is bankrupt today.
What I have translated were just the headline and sub-headlines. What the story proper contains it better not be put in a family newspaper. The same newspapers that carry these weird reports are quite undiscriminating when it comes to advertising. But for them, faith healers and mumbo-jumbo men in the city of Gujranwala will go out of business. Here, for instance, is “spiritual scholar, presidential award winner Pirzada Amjad Shah of Bukhari Chowk, Pindi Bypass, GT Road, Gujranwala” addressing “grieving brothers and sisters living in foreign lands”.
Each and every wish they have will be fulfilled, he promises. In just one night, through the power of Istikhara, every difficulty they face will be resolved. As for black spells cast on them, it will take just a couple of days to dissipate them. “One phone call can save your life. Let those who doubt try me.”
I have come to the conclusion that there is no future in journalism. I am applying to Pirzada Amjad Shah Bukhari of GT Road, Gujranwala to appoint me his spiritual ambassador to Washington. Who knows I may be asked by the Pakistani embassy to find an antidote to the black magic spell some swear it has been under for years.
Khalid Hasan is Daily Times’ US-based correspondent. His e-mail is khasan2@cox.net
The advent of the Pakistani TV channels has been a disaster in many ways. You go to any Pakistani home and one or the other of these channels is on. The mullahdom of Pakistan, which has taken to TV as a duck takes to water, now enjoys a trans-Atlantic audience
Short of Indiana Jones materialising in Pakistan, removing the sitting judges of the present Supreme Court and replacing them with the ones General Musharraf sent home last November, there appears little chance of putting the clock back.
Aitzaz Ahsan’s flying visit to Washington and New York seems to have been in vain as Uncle Sam is neither willing to intervene nor actually keen on the old judges coming back. The only comeback kids known in this country are prizefighters and those comebacks happen more in movies than in real life. Remember Rocky.
Every time an American official has been asked about the restoration of the judges deposed by Gen Musharraf in one swift swoop, the answer has been the same. “The US believes in a free judiciary but this is a matter internal to Pakistan and can only be resolved in Pakistan itself.” Translated into simple English, it means: No comebacks.
As for the Pakistanis settled here, they are a spitting image of their countrymen back home. There is little tolerance for the other’s point of view and public display of temper is considered good form, being always in evidence. Arguments are not won by reason but by shouting louder than the opponent. Anyone found in disagreement is declared a traitor and sometimes even beyond the pale of Islam.
There is no dialogue, only declamatory denunciations. Conspiracy theories are not only rampant but fervently believed. It is widely believed that the 9/11 attacks were engineered by a grand international cabal, controlled by Tel Aviv, to give Muslims in general and Arabs in particular a bad name. Why did the twin towers fall on to themselves in a heap, you are asked. If told that engineering studies have established that they fell as they were supposed to fall in such a catastrophic event, you are told, “But of course, that’s what those studies will say. What else would you expect?” I have of course stopped contradicting those who swear that on that day, all the Jews working in the twin towers were told not to turn up. The frequency with which I have heard this may soon induce me to start believing it myself.
The advent of the Pakistani TV channels has been a disaster in many ways. You go to any Pakistani home and one or the other of these channels is on. The mullahdom of Pakistan, which has taken to TV as a duck takes to water, now enjoys a trans-Atlantic audience. On one such programme, I heard a lady in New York ask by phone from a bearded gent in circus-worthy headgear and gown if after taking a shower, it would still be necessary for her to perform ablution for offering namaz. “Most certainly, otherwise you will be in a “na-paak” state.”
All Pakistani TV drama serials, without exception, revolve around marriage and domestic bickering caused by marriages that have either taken place or marriages that have not taken place. I have yet to hear of a serial dedicated to any other theme. In a country as grossly, almost indecently, populated as Pakistan, marriage ought to be discouraged rather than promoted.
But to return to the visits of Aitzaz Ahsan, Ahsan Iqbal and Justice Wajihuddin and their public meetings, it was quite clear that the local PPP cadres were under instructions from party headquarters back home to cause disruption. The way these three were questioned and often interrupted with identically worded questions betrayed the origin of those questions. Local PPP jiyalas attacked the visitors frontally and, in some cases, through newspaper advertisements.
Right in front of me, I have a full-page ad inserted by eight New York PPP men headlined “Judges with dead consciences turned a dictator into a king-maker,” followed by a charge sheet. Highlights: The Supreme Court was guilty of high treason when a democratic government was overthrown in 1999. The dictator’s favourite judges gave him the right to rule at will. That bench included Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry. Why did Chaudhry take oath under a PCO? Let the nation choose between the major and the minor criminal. If Musharraf’s November 2007 judges are illegal, so are those who took oath in October 1999. Did Asif Zardari, Yousaf Raza Gilani and Javed Hashmi, who were in prison for 11, 5 and 4 years respectively receive justice from the courts of Iftikhar Chaudhry and Wajihuddin? We will not permit any conspiracy against our leaders to succeed.
New York is home to several weekly Urdu newspapers, which are distributed free and since they cost nothing, they are picked up from grocery stores and read. But what reading do some of them offer? Here is the second lead from one. The headline informs readers that for the last eight years, the Pakistan government has been in the hands of Qadianis, an ugly conspiracy that has now been unearthed. Shaukat Aziz, Tariq Aziz, former ambassador Gen Durrani and several civil and military officials were involved in that conspiracy. The operations in the tribal areas were launched to crush the Sunni movement and establish control over the ISI and MI. There has been no investment in Pakistan by Europe or America in the last 61 years. Under the patronage of Sehba Musharraf, Citibank senior vice president Junaid Rabbani and other influential figures made contact with the Jewish lobby and Saudi princes. Pakistan was made to borrow heavily from the IMF and the World Bank at exorbitant interest rates, which is why the country is bankrupt today.
What I have translated were just the headline and sub-headlines. What the story proper contains it better not be put in a family newspaper. The same newspapers that carry these weird reports are quite undiscriminating when it comes to advertising. But for them, faith healers and mumbo-jumbo men in the city of Gujranwala will go out of business. Here, for instance, is “spiritual scholar, presidential award winner Pirzada Amjad Shah of Bukhari Chowk, Pindi Bypass, GT Road, Gujranwala” addressing “grieving brothers and sisters living in foreign lands”.
Each and every wish they have will be fulfilled, he promises. In just one night, through the power of Istikhara, every difficulty they face will be resolved. As for black spells cast on them, it will take just a couple of days to dissipate them. “One phone call can save your life. Let those who doubt try me.”
I have come to the conclusion that there is no future in journalism. I am applying to Pirzada Amjad Shah Bukhari of GT Road, Gujranwala to appoint me his spiritual ambassador to Washington. Who knows I may be asked by the Pakistani embassy to find an antidote to the black magic spell some swear it has been under for years.
Khalid Hasan is Daily Times’ US-based correspondent. His e-mail is khasan2@cox.net
ANALYSIS: Political dimensions of counter-terrorism —Dr Hasan-Askari Rizvi
http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2008\07\06\story_6-7-2008_pg3_2
The PPP government cannot expect support on counter-terrorism and related issues from major political parties and groups without reciprocating with accommodating gestures on their concerns and demands
The recently initiated security operation in Bara and Jamrud areas of Khyber Agency represents a shift in the Government of Pakistan’s disposition towards the tribal areas. While not abandoning the dialogue option, the government has decided to contain militancy in Khyber Agency because it threatened the road link to Afghanistan and challenged peace and stability in and around Peshawar.
Though the two Bara-based militant Islamic groups were not directly involved in the insurgency in Afghanistan, they fought pitched battles against each other and functioned separately as Islamic vigilantes in the area under their control. State officials hardly functioned in these areas, and the groups shared the strategy of the Pakistani Taliban of extending their vigilante role to the settled areas of NWFP. Encouraged by their defiance of state authority, many criminal elements also threatened the people to pursue their anti-social agendas.
No new security operation has so far been launched in the more troubled areas of the two Waziristan agencies and Swat. In Waziristan, the government engaged in a dialogue with a variety of groups, including the Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP), which temporarily improved the security environment. The hope for some enduring political arrangements with them collapsed when activists of Baitullah Mehsud killed several rival tribesmen and publicly executed two people, signalling a return to his violent approach. They vowed to fight American and NATO troops in Afghanistan.
In Swat, despite two agreements with Sufi Muhammad of Tehrik-e Nifaz-e Shariat-e Muhammadi (TNSM) and his son-in-law, Mullah Fazalullah, a top Taliban commander in Swat, local Taliban resumed their violent activities after a lull in violence for a couple of weeks. They are now targeting government property, female educational institutions and security personnel, declaring that the government has not fulfilled its commitment to withdraw security personnel from the area and that these troops periodically take action against them.
The security operation in Khyber Agency is important as it reflects the government’s desire to contain militancy. However, this operation is not likely to fully cope with the totality of the challenge Pakistan faces in the tribal areas. The situation is far more complex in other parts of the tribal areas and Swat with ramifications for the rest of Pakistan and Afghanistan.
The government’s dilemma is not limited to the enormity of the problems of extremism and militancy but also its inability to develop a broad-based consensus on the ways and means for coping with extremism and terrorism. Initially, the Pakistani state under General Zia-ul Haq consciously promoted Islamic orthodoxy and militancy with the cooperation of the United States and conservative Arab states. Pakistan continued to use militancy as an instrument of foreign and security policies long after other partners abandoned their support.
Even in the post-September 2001 period the militant groups in the tribal areas were not viewed as a direct threat to Pakistan because they targeted Afghanistan and the Karzai government that did not enjoy the blessings of Pakistani military authorities. The failure to fully comprehend the threat of militancy in the tribal areas contributed to compromising the potential of security operations during 2003-07 to dislodge militant groups.
It was not until late 2007 and early 2008 when the Taliban resorted to suicide bombings and targeted army personnel and installations with greater frequency that the official circles and security establishment realised the acuteness of the Taliban threat to Pakistan’s internal security. By that time the Taliban had established themselves firmly in many parts of the tribal areas and cultivated links with Pakistan’s mainland-based madrassas, militant Islamic groups and parties in the NWFP and the Punjab.
These linkages ensure sympathy and support for the Taliban in many political and societal circles, especially among Islamic circles. Some of the mainland militant and sectarian groups maintain links with the Taliban and use the tribal areas for training their personnel and some of them join the Taliban in their ‘missions’ in Afghanistan. These mainland militant groups facilitate Taliban personnel when they are in the settled areas on violent ‘missions’.
In the past the Jamaat-e Islami, the JUIF and the JUIS maintained a discreet distance from the militant groups and took exception to their methods. However, these parties have openly criticised the resumption of security operations in Khyber Agency. The Jamaat-e Islami chief declared that the Taliban did not constitute a threat to Pakistan’s internal security. Their opposition to the security operation is indicative of their self-cultivated concern that the security operation may be the beginning of the PPP effort to contain and downsize all types of Islamic groups and organisations.
There are other reasons for opposition to the on-going security operation by some political and societal groups. Some opposition can be attributed to the widespread anti-US sentiment in political circles and among the ordinary people, who think that Pakistan has given up on the dialogue and resorted to security operations under pressure from the United States.
Richard Boucher’s visit to Islamabad within two days of the initiation of the operation in the tribal areas strengthened the perception that it was undertaken on the directions of the US, and Boucher was visiting Pakistan to make sure that the Pakistani authorities did not change their mind.
Further, Boucher’s statement on the future of Musharraf and what should be the political priorities of the Pakistani government did not help. This was viewed as yet another proof of American support for Pervez Musharraf, and as unsolicited advice to the government. As long as the US administration does not cultivate goodwill with the political circles and societal activists, the Taliban will continue to enjoy varying degrees of support in Pakistan because they are viewed as having the courage to defy the US.
Another reason for the lack of adequate popular support is that the Pakistan state under General Zia-ul Haq socialised young people in the 1980s into Islamic orthodoxy and militancy. This pattern continued even afterwards because the army and the ISI viewed militant groups as an instrument for advancing foreign policy and the security agenda in Afghanistan and Indian-administered Kashmir. These people have imbibed radical discourse to such an extent that they can hardly think of any alternate political perspective. Even Musharraf patronised such elements in order to hold on to power in the post-2002 period.
These people are now strategically placed in the society, government and security apparatus, and are not always convinced that the Pakistani state should declare war on the Taliban and other Islamic militants. An important ingredient of their worldview is the varying degree of anti-Americanism.
Still another reason for opposition to the security operation in Khyber Agency is the failure of the PPP government to keep its political allies on board for governance and political management. The divergence between the PPP and the PMLN and a large number of societal groups on the restoration of judges and the future of Musharraf has increased distrust between them. This has caused the PMLN to withhold support to the government on the security operation.
The PPP government cannot expect support on counter-terrorism and related issues from major political parties and groups without reciprocating with accommodating gestures on their concerns and demands. Reciprocity, accommodation and a shared approach are key to strengthening the government’s capacity to deal with complex issues like counter-insurgency. Some of the opposition to security operations is the product of the inability of the PPP to maintain harmonious interaction with other political parties.
Dr Hasan-Askari Rizvi is a political and defence analyst
The PPP government cannot expect support on counter-terrorism and related issues from major political parties and groups without reciprocating with accommodating gestures on their concerns and demands
The recently initiated security operation in Bara and Jamrud areas of Khyber Agency represents a shift in the Government of Pakistan’s disposition towards the tribal areas. While not abandoning the dialogue option, the government has decided to contain militancy in Khyber Agency because it threatened the road link to Afghanistan and challenged peace and stability in and around Peshawar.
Though the two Bara-based militant Islamic groups were not directly involved in the insurgency in Afghanistan, they fought pitched battles against each other and functioned separately as Islamic vigilantes in the area under their control. State officials hardly functioned in these areas, and the groups shared the strategy of the Pakistani Taliban of extending their vigilante role to the settled areas of NWFP. Encouraged by their defiance of state authority, many criminal elements also threatened the people to pursue their anti-social agendas.
No new security operation has so far been launched in the more troubled areas of the two Waziristan agencies and Swat. In Waziristan, the government engaged in a dialogue with a variety of groups, including the Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP), which temporarily improved the security environment. The hope for some enduring political arrangements with them collapsed when activists of Baitullah Mehsud killed several rival tribesmen and publicly executed two people, signalling a return to his violent approach. They vowed to fight American and NATO troops in Afghanistan.
In Swat, despite two agreements with Sufi Muhammad of Tehrik-e Nifaz-e Shariat-e Muhammadi (TNSM) and his son-in-law, Mullah Fazalullah, a top Taliban commander in Swat, local Taliban resumed their violent activities after a lull in violence for a couple of weeks. They are now targeting government property, female educational institutions and security personnel, declaring that the government has not fulfilled its commitment to withdraw security personnel from the area and that these troops periodically take action against them.
The security operation in Khyber Agency is important as it reflects the government’s desire to contain militancy. However, this operation is not likely to fully cope with the totality of the challenge Pakistan faces in the tribal areas. The situation is far more complex in other parts of the tribal areas and Swat with ramifications for the rest of Pakistan and Afghanistan.
The government’s dilemma is not limited to the enormity of the problems of extremism and militancy but also its inability to develop a broad-based consensus on the ways and means for coping with extremism and terrorism. Initially, the Pakistani state under General Zia-ul Haq consciously promoted Islamic orthodoxy and militancy with the cooperation of the United States and conservative Arab states. Pakistan continued to use militancy as an instrument of foreign and security policies long after other partners abandoned their support.
Even in the post-September 2001 period the militant groups in the tribal areas were not viewed as a direct threat to Pakistan because they targeted Afghanistan and the Karzai government that did not enjoy the blessings of Pakistani military authorities. The failure to fully comprehend the threat of militancy in the tribal areas contributed to compromising the potential of security operations during 2003-07 to dislodge militant groups.
It was not until late 2007 and early 2008 when the Taliban resorted to suicide bombings and targeted army personnel and installations with greater frequency that the official circles and security establishment realised the acuteness of the Taliban threat to Pakistan’s internal security. By that time the Taliban had established themselves firmly in many parts of the tribal areas and cultivated links with Pakistan’s mainland-based madrassas, militant Islamic groups and parties in the NWFP and the Punjab.
These linkages ensure sympathy and support for the Taliban in many political and societal circles, especially among Islamic circles. Some of the mainland militant and sectarian groups maintain links with the Taliban and use the tribal areas for training their personnel and some of them join the Taliban in their ‘missions’ in Afghanistan. These mainland militant groups facilitate Taliban personnel when they are in the settled areas on violent ‘missions’.
In the past the Jamaat-e Islami, the JUIF and the JUIS maintained a discreet distance from the militant groups and took exception to their methods. However, these parties have openly criticised the resumption of security operations in Khyber Agency. The Jamaat-e Islami chief declared that the Taliban did not constitute a threat to Pakistan’s internal security. Their opposition to the security operation is indicative of their self-cultivated concern that the security operation may be the beginning of the PPP effort to contain and downsize all types of Islamic groups and organisations.
There are other reasons for opposition to the on-going security operation by some political and societal groups. Some opposition can be attributed to the widespread anti-US sentiment in political circles and among the ordinary people, who think that Pakistan has given up on the dialogue and resorted to security operations under pressure from the United States.
Richard Boucher’s visit to Islamabad within two days of the initiation of the operation in the tribal areas strengthened the perception that it was undertaken on the directions of the US, and Boucher was visiting Pakistan to make sure that the Pakistani authorities did not change their mind.
Further, Boucher’s statement on the future of Musharraf and what should be the political priorities of the Pakistani government did not help. This was viewed as yet another proof of American support for Pervez Musharraf, and as unsolicited advice to the government. As long as the US administration does not cultivate goodwill with the political circles and societal activists, the Taliban will continue to enjoy varying degrees of support in Pakistan because they are viewed as having the courage to defy the US.
Another reason for the lack of adequate popular support is that the Pakistan state under General Zia-ul Haq socialised young people in the 1980s into Islamic orthodoxy and militancy. This pattern continued even afterwards because the army and the ISI viewed militant groups as an instrument for advancing foreign policy and the security agenda in Afghanistan and Indian-administered Kashmir. These people have imbibed radical discourse to such an extent that they can hardly think of any alternate political perspective. Even Musharraf patronised such elements in order to hold on to power in the post-2002 period.
These people are now strategically placed in the society, government and security apparatus, and are not always convinced that the Pakistani state should declare war on the Taliban and other Islamic militants. An important ingredient of their worldview is the varying degree of anti-Americanism.
Still another reason for opposition to the security operation in Khyber Agency is the failure of the PPP government to keep its political allies on board for governance and political management. The divergence between the PPP and the PMLN and a large number of societal groups on the restoration of judges and the future of Musharraf has increased distrust between them. This has caused the PMLN to withhold support to the government on the security operation.
The PPP government cannot expect support on counter-terrorism and related issues from major political parties and groups without reciprocating with accommodating gestures on their concerns and demands. Reciprocity, accommodation and a shared approach are key to strengthening the government’s capacity to deal with complex issues like counter-insurgency. Some of the opposition to security operations is the product of the inability of the PPP to maintain harmonious interaction with other political parties.
Dr Hasan-Askari Rizvi is a political and defence analyst
view: Sarkozy’s secret rupture —Pascal Boniface
http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2008\06\26\story_26-6-2008_pg3_4
Although this may seem mundane outside France, Sarkozy’s foreign policy revolution has incited fierce opposition at home. Indeed, all left-wing parties denounce Sarkozy’s rupture with the Fifth Republic’s military/diplomatic heritage
A year ago, when Nicolas Sarkozy was campaigning for the French presidency, he promised a “rupture” with the past. So far, few French people can see the sort of rupture that Sarkozy promised. But they are wrong to think that nothing has changed in the first year of his presidency. Sarkozy has, in fact, brought about a rupture, albeit in an unexpected area: the foreign policy consensus that has prevailed since the days of Charles de Gaulle.
Of course, it is impossible at this early stage to evaluate with any degree of precision the long-term strategic repercussions of Sarkozy’s apparent decision to return France to NATO’s integrated military command and strengthen the French military commitment to NATO’s out-of-theatre engagement — its first ever — in Afghanistan. But the implication of these decisions is clear: France under Sarkozy is now back at the heart of the Atlantic alliance.
Although this may seem mundane outside France, Sarkozy’s foreign policy revolution has incited fierce opposition at home. Indeed, all left-wing parties denounce Sarkozy’s rupture with the Fifth Republic’s military/diplomatic heritage.
Of course, the Left’s real quarrel with Sarkozy’s policy has at its roots in his conception of France’s relationship with the United States. Wariness of America was, to be sure, not just a leftist pose; many Gaullists over the decades have been tinged with anti-Americanism, too. But, although Sarkozy may not have sold his party on the merits of George Bush’s America, he has softened its once habitual suspicions about the US. As a result, a Left-Right divide has opened in this central area of French diplomacy — a division that has not been seen in France for four decades.
The French Left, not surprisingly, rejects Sarkozy’s Atlanticist impulses and frequently charges him with betraying General de Gaulle’s legacy. The majority of French people, however, appear to favour improving ties with the US.
There is more than a little irony here. In the year that the Socialists are celebrating the fortieth anniversary of the May 1968 demonstrations against de Gaulle, they are also trying to steal his diplomatic clothes by proclaiming themselves the defenders of the independent French foreign policy that he championed.
In the 1960s, both Socialists and Centrists denounced de Gaulle’s “anti-Americanism”. On NATO, France’s Middle East policy, or the constitution, Francois Mitterrand (the Socialist leader in the 1960s) and the opposition sharply criticised de Gaulle’s go-it-alone ways for shattering the Alliance consensus. Indeed, the Socialists opposed de Gaulle’s decision to withdraw France from NATO’s unified military command, opposed the creation of an independent French nuclear arsenal (they preferred the American nuclear guarantee), and were hostile to de Gaulle’s rupture with Israel after the Six Day War.
But the Socialists began to change their stripes in the late 1970s, rallying around the concept of nuclear dissuasion as a guarantee of national independence and beginning to distance themselves from America. Although Mitterrand did stand firm with the US on the stationing of Pershing missiles in Europe in the early 1980s, which won him respect from President Ronald Reagan, by this point the Gaullist consensus on the fundamentals of French foreign policy had spread across all political groups. Even the Communist Party could be said to have basically embraced its tenets.
Sarkozy has now broken with this so-called “Gaullist- Mitterrandist” orientation, which was based on the persistence of a belief in French “exceptionalism” in the field of foreign affairs. This does not mean that Sarkozy’s France will toe the American line on all international issues. Far from it. But it does mean that France will no longer oppose America just for the sake of opposing America. —DT-PS
Pascal Boniface is Director of the Institute for International and Strategic relations, Paris (IRIS). His most recent book is Football et Mondialisation (Football and Globalisation)
Although this may seem mundane outside France, Sarkozy’s foreign policy revolution has incited fierce opposition at home. Indeed, all left-wing parties denounce Sarkozy’s rupture with the Fifth Republic’s military/diplomatic heritage
A year ago, when Nicolas Sarkozy was campaigning for the French presidency, he promised a “rupture” with the past. So far, few French people can see the sort of rupture that Sarkozy promised. But they are wrong to think that nothing has changed in the first year of his presidency. Sarkozy has, in fact, brought about a rupture, albeit in an unexpected area: the foreign policy consensus that has prevailed since the days of Charles de Gaulle.
Of course, it is impossible at this early stage to evaluate with any degree of precision the long-term strategic repercussions of Sarkozy’s apparent decision to return France to NATO’s integrated military command and strengthen the French military commitment to NATO’s out-of-theatre engagement — its first ever — in Afghanistan. But the implication of these decisions is clear: France under Sarkozy is now back at the heart of the Atlantic alliance.
Although this may seem mundane outside France, Sarkozy’s foreign policy revolution has incited fierce opposition at home. Indeed, all left-wing parties denounce Sarkozy’s rupture with the Fifth Republic’s military/diplomatic heritage.
Of course, the Left’s real quarrel with Sarkozy’s policy has at its roots in his conception of France’s relationship with the United States. Wariness of America was, to be sure, not just a leftist pose; many Gaullists over the decades have been tinged with anti-Americanism, too. But, although Sarkozy may not have sold his party on the merits of George Bush’s America, he has softened its once habitual suspicions about the US. As a result, a Left-Right divide has opened in this central area of French diplomacy — a division that has not been seen in France for four decades.
The French Left, not surprisingly, rejects Sarkozy’s Atlanticist impulses and frequently charges him with betraying General de Gaulle’s legacy. The majority of French people, however, appear to favour improving ties with the US.
There is more than a little irony here. In the year that the Socialists are celebrating the fortieth anniversary of the May 1968 demonstrations against de Gaulle, they are also trying to steal his diplomatic clothes by proclaiming themselves the defenders of the independent French foreign policy that he championed.
In the 1960s, both Socialists and Centrists denounced de Gaulle’s “anti-Americanism”. On NATO, France’s Middle East policy, or the constitution, Francois Mitterrand (the Socialist leader in the 1960s) and the opposition sharply criticised de Gaulle’s go-it-alone ways for shattering the Alliance consensus. Indeed, the Socialists opposed de Gaulle’s decision to withdraw France from NATO’s unified military command, opposed the creation of an independent French nuclear arsenal (they preferred the American nuclear guarantee), and were hostile to de Gaulle’s rupture with Israel after the Six Day War.
But the Socialists began to change their stripes in the late 1970s, rallying around the concept of nuclear dissuasion as a guarantee of national independence and beginning to distance themselves from America. Although Mitterrand did stand firm with the US on the stationing of Pershing missiles in Europe in the early 1980s, which won him respect from President Ronald Reagan, by this point the Gaullist consensus on the fundamentals of French foreign policy had spread across all political groups. Even the Communist Party could be said to have basically embraced its tenets.
Sarkozy has now broken with this so-called “Gaullist- Mitterrandist” orientation, which was based on the persistence of a belief in French “exceptionalism” in the field of foreign affairs. This does not mean that Sarkozy’s France will toe the American line on all international issues. Far from it. But it does mean that France will no longer oppose America just for the sake of opposing America. —DT-PS
Pascal Boniface is Director of the Institute for International and Strategic relations, Paris (IRIS). His most recent book is Football et Mondialisation (Football and Globalisation)
analysis: Warring allies —Talat Masood
http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2008\06\26\story_26-6-2008_pg3_2
The government should seriously consider creating a dedicated organisational structure in the Cabinet Division to deal exclusively with the insurgency in the tribal belt and the NWFP, which would coordinate with different agencies and all major stakeholders
Pakistan’s relations with the United States and Afghanistan once again came under severe strain when precision guided bombs and missiles struck in Mohmand Agency, killing 12 Frontier Corps personnel and wounding several others. To make matters worse, President Karzai made that quixotic threat of sending his army to capture or kill Pakistani Taliban leaders.
Several interpretations were given to these happenings. The border skirmish could well have been a case of an unmarked international boundary, disputed between Pakistan and Afghanistan, being grossly mismanaged at the operational level. Or was it a deliberate attempt on the part of Washington to give a clear signal to Pakistan that we no longer trust the Pakistani military, especially the Frontier Corps? Was this a means of conveying US displeasure with the peace talks with militants?
President Karzai too could not have spoken without Washington’s blessings. All indications are that Washington is orchestrating the policy of ensuring that Pakistan reverses its policy or face de-stabilisation. Such wide differences in policy on combating insurgency between key allies, coupled with lack of mutual trust, are indeed a matter of great concern that could have far reaching implications for regional and global security.
Americans are highly sceptical about peace agreements. They refer to past experiences of 2005 and 2007 wherein the militants took full advantage of peace accords to consolidate and expand their influence in FATA and the NWFP, and developed enhanced capabilities of launching cross-border attacks into Afghanistan.
Pakistan maintains that these agreements are being negotiated from a position of strength. The army is not being withdrawn but being re-deployed so that it is not in a provocative posture that invades the privacy of conservative tribal culture. In any case exclusive reliance on military instrument has only enhanced the power of the Taliban and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan’s tribal belt and adjoining areas. The presence of foreign troops on Afghan soil and Pakistan Army’s supportive role have given rise to a strong nationalist impulse in the Pashtun belt that strengthens the militant support base.
Political dialogue accompanied by economic development and selective use of force should be the best option for combating these militants. Peace agreements will provide the tactical or strategic pause for the government to regain control incrementally and provide a means to isolate diehard militants. Islamabad also maintains that these are our own people and a civilian democratic government cannot disregard the sensitivities of the population as an imperial power like the United States can afford to do.
There is another major area of difference. Pakistan feels that American and NATO forces are not addressing the real problems in Afghanistan that have given Taliban the strength to dominate several provinces in the south of the country and are the root cause of militancy. There has been an exponential increase in poppy cultivation, making Afghanistan the world’s largest opium producer (97 percent) and a major source of financing for militants and warlords.
Moreover, no effort has been made to strengthen state structures in South, South-East and South-West Afghanistan. The international community has given scant attention to the repatriation and rehabilitation of Afghan refugees from Pakistan, and the refugee situation remains a source of potential militancy and instability. On the contrary, the blame is being placed on Pakistan for all these problems.
Besides, by relying heavily on airpower and less on ground operations, US and ISAF forces push the militants to the Pakistani side, and then expect that we will fight their war with all its attendant fallout, including collateral damage.
The State Department and the Pentagon also blame Pakistan for inaction and for turning a blind eye to the safe havens that straddle the Pak-Afghan border. Members of the US Congress and many think tanks have been questioning the purpose of providing US largesse in the form of military or even economic assistance if Pakistan is not willing or prepared to engage with the militants military.
This circular argument runs between the two allies, with the militants as the main beneficiaries of the blame game, despite enormous sacrifices made both by our military and civilian population.
Clearly, all this indicates that there is an urgent need for the civilian government to have a national counterinsurgency policy that has the approval of Parliament, and an organisation that exercises effective control over its implementation.
The policy should be comprehensive, covering political, economic, social and military aspects so that root causes of insurgency are addressed. The past practice of policy emanating from the military and intelligence agencies should cease, although their input should be a valuable resource.
The government should seriously consider creating a dedicated organisational structure in the Cabinet Division to deal exclusively with the insurgency in the tribal belt and the NWFP, which would coordinate with different agencies and all major stakeholders. It should be the focal point for conducting, coordinating and implementing policy decisions. Coordination both at the policy and implementation level is critical between all stakeholders, the Centre, the NWFP, the military, Ministry of Interior and the intelligence agencies.
Equally important is to take the US and NATO in confidence and address their concerns, otherwise Pakistan’s efforts at fighting insurgency will not succeed. Pakistan has to ensure that the US, Afghanistan and NATO countries operating in Afghanistan are brought on board. Unless all external stakeholders — especially Afghanistan — do not share the same vision, cooperate at every level and enjoy mutual trust, the policy is doomed to failure.
Despite being the sole superpower, the United States, when faced with fighting asymmetrical warfare or imposing its will in this part of the world, should have learnt by now that there are limits to its power. Sheer military might is not enough to achieve political and strategic objectives. Despite its overwhelming military superiority, the US has not been able to suppress the revitalised Taliban that today control wide swathes of territory in many parts of Afghanistan.
What is needed is a serious attempt at bringing change in policy and attitudes that harmonises with the social and political milieu and lays the foundation for regional peace and stability in the long run.
The writer is a retired Lieutenant General of the Pakistan Army. He can be reached at talat@comsats.net.pk
The government should seriously consider creating a dedicated organisational structure in the Cabinet Division to deal exclusively with the insurgency in the tribal belt and the NWFP, which would coordinate with different agencies and all major stakeholders
Pakistan’s relations with the United States and Afghanistan once again came under severe strain when precision guided bombs and missiles struck in Mohmand Agency, killing 12 Frontier Corps personnel and wounding several others. To make matters worse, President Karzai made that quixotic threat of sending his army to capture or kill Pakistani Taliban leaders.
Several interpretations were given to these happenings. The border skirmish could well have been a case of an unmarked international boundary, disputed between Pakistan and Afghanistan, being grossly mismanaged at the operational level. Or was it a deliberate attempt on the part of Washington to give a clear signal to Pakistan that we no longer trust the Pakistani military, especially the Frontier Corps? Was this a means of conveying US displeasure with the peace talks with militants?
President Karzai too could not have spoken without Washington’s blessings. All indications are that Washington is orchestrating the policy of ensuring that Pakistan reverses its policy or face de-stabilisation. Such wide differences in policy on combating insurgency between key allies, coupled with lack of mutual trust, are indeed a matter of great concern that could have far reaching implications for regional and global security.
Americans are highly sceptical about peace agreements. They refer to past experiences of 2005 and 2007 wherein the militants took full advantage of peace accords to consolidate and expand their influence in FATA and the NWFP, and developed enhanced capabilities of launching cross-border attacks into Afghanistan.
Pakistan maintains that these agreements are being negotiated from a position of strength. The army is not being withdrawn but being re-deployed so that it is not in a provocative posture that invades the privacy of conservative tribal culture. In any case exclusive reliance on military instrument has only enhanced the power of the Taliban and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan’s tribal belt and adjoining areas. The presence of foreign troops on Afghan soil and Pakistan Army’s supportive role have given rise to a strong nationalist impulse in the Pashtun belt that strengthens the militant support base.
Political dialogue accompanied by economic development and selective use of force should be the best option for combating these militants. Peace agreements will provide the tactical or strategic pause for the government to regain control incrementally and provide a means to isolate diehard militants. Islamabad also maintains that these are our own people and a civilian democratic government cannot disregard the sensitivities of the population as an imperial power like the United States can afford to do.
There is another major area of difference. Pakistan feels that American and NATO forces are not addressing the real problems in Afghanistan that have given Taliban the strength to dominate several provinces in the south of the country and are the root cause of militancy. There has been an exponential increase in poppy cultivation, making Afghanistan the world’s largest opium producer (97 percent) and a major source of financing for militants and warlords.
Moreover, no effort has been made to strengthen state structures in South, South-East and South-West Afghanistan. The international community has given scant attention to the repatriation and rehabilitation of Afghan refugees from Pakistan, and the refugee situation remains a source of potential militancy and instability. On the contrary, the blame is being placed on Pakistan for all these problems.
Besides, by relying heavily on airpower and less on ground operations, US and ISAF forces push the militants to the Pakistani side, and then expect that we will fight their war with all its attendant fallout, including collateral damage.
The State Department and the Pentagon also blame Pakistan for inaction and for turning a blind eye to the safe havens that straddle the Pak-Afghan border. Members of the US Congress and many think tanks have been questioning the purpose of providing US largesse in the form of military or even economic assistance if Pakistan is not willing or prepared to engage with the militants military.
This circular argument runs between the two allies, with the militants as the main beneficiaries of the blame game, despite enormous sacrifices made both by our military and civilian population.
Clearly, all this indicates that there is an urgent need for the civilian government to have a national counterinsurgency policy that has the approval of Parliament, and an organisation that exercises effective control over its implementation.
The policy should be comprehensive, covering political, economic, social and military aspects so that root causes of insurgency are addressed. The past practice of policy emanating from the military and intelligence agencies should cease, although their input should be a valuable resource.
The government should seriously consider creating a dedicated organisational structure in the Cabinet Division to deal exclusively with the insurgency in the tribal belt and the NWFP, which would coordinate with different agencies and all major stakeholders. It should be the focal point for conducting, coordinating and implementing policy decisions. Coordination both at the policy and implementation level is critical between all stakeholders, the Centre, the NWFP, the military, Ministry of Interior and the intelligence agencies.
Equally important is to take the US and NATO in confidence and address their concerns, otherwise Pakistan’s efforts at fighting insurgency will not succeed. Pakistan has to ensure that the US, Afghanistan and NATO countries operating in Afghanistan are brought on board. Unless all external stakeholders — especially Afghanistan — do not share the same vision, cooperate at every level and enjoy mutual trust, the policy is doomed to failure.
Despite being the sole superpower, the United States, when faced with fighting asymmetrical warfare or imposing its will in this part of the world, should have learnt by now that there are limits to its power. Sheer military might is not enough to achieve political and strategic objectives. Despite its overwhelming military superiority, the US has not been able to suppress the revitalised Taliban that today control wide swathes of territory in many parts of Afghanistan.
What is needed is a serious attempt at bringing change in policy and attitudes that harmonises with the social and political milieu and lays the foundation for regional peace and stability in the long run.
The writer is a retired Lieutenant General of the Pakistan Army. He can be reached at talat@comsats.net.pk
OPINION: Escaping forwards —Uri Avnery
http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2008\05\27\story_27-5-2008_pg3_5
Conventional wisdom has it that to make peace, one needs a strong leader. Now it appears that the opposite also works: that a weak leader, almost submerged in troubles, whose term in office could come to a sudden end at any moment and whose coalition stands on feet of clay — he too may risk all to make peace
THE GERMANS call it “die Flucht nach vorne” — escaping forwards. When the situation is desperate, attack! Instead of retreating, advance! When there is no way out, storm ahead!
This method was successful in 1948. At the end of May, the Egyptian army was advancing on Tel Aviv. We — a very, very thin line of soldiers — were all that stood in its way. So we attacked. Again and again and again. We suffered heavy losses. But we stopped the Egyptian advance.
Now Ehud Olmert is applying the same method. His situation is desperate. Most people in Israel do not doubt that he has received large bribes in envelopes stuffed with dollars. The Attorney General is liable to indict him any time, and this will compel him to resign.
And lo and behold, at the most critical moment, just before the most damning details come out, a joint statement is issued simultaneously in Jerusalem, Damascus and Ankara, announcing the start of peace negotiations between Israel and Syria, with Turkey acting as mediator. The talks will be based on the principles of the 1991 Madrid Conference, meaning the return of the entire Golan Heights.
In this, too, Olmert is the worthy pupil of his predecessor and mentor, Ariel Sharon.
Sharon was up to his neck in corruption affairs. In one of them, the so-called “Greek Island affair”, the Israeli millionaire David Appel paid huge sums to Sharon’s son, a novice, for “advice”. At the time, too, it seemed that the Attorney General could not possibly avoid issuing an indictment.
Sharon’s response was sheer genius: the Separation. Separation from the Gaza Strip. Separation from the Attorney General.
That was a gigantic operation. In a minutely orchestrated melodramatic performance, the Gush Katif settlements were dismantled. Together with several army divisions, all police forces — the same police that was supposed to investigate the Sharon family’s business affairs — were deployed in a breath-taking national endeavour. The peace camp supported, of course, the evacuation of the settlements. The corruption affairs were all but forgotten.
Now Ehud Olmert has to negotiate a cease-fire. For Sharon, though, the entire exercise was a success. If he had not suffered a stroke, he would still be Prime Minister today. The lesson did not escape Olmert.
Maybe my aesthetic sense is blunted. Because I am ready to accept peace even from a totally corrupt leader, even from Satan himself. If the corruption of a politician causes him to do something that will save the lives of hundreds and thousands of human beings on both sides — that’s OK with me. Didn’t the philosopher Friedrich Hegel talk about the “cunning of reason”?
The Bible recounts that when the army of Damascus laid siege to Samaria, the capital of the Kingdom of Israel, four leprous men brought the news that the enemy had fled (2 Kings, 7). The Hebrew poetess Rachel wrote, alluding to this story, that she was not willing to receive good news from lepers. Well, I am.
Conventional wisdom has it that to make peace, one needs a strong leader. Now it appears that the opposite also works: that a weak leader, almost submerged in troubles, whose term in office could come to a sudden end at any moment and whose coalition stands on feet of clay, a leader who has nothing to lose — he too may risk all to make peace.
The plot may move on from here in several possible directions.
The first possibility: it’s all “spin” — an American term that has become Olmert’s middle name. He will just stretch the negotiations out like bubble gum, as he has been doing with the Palestinians, and wait for the storm to blow over.
It will be difficult for him to do so, because Turkey is now a partner in the game. Even Olmert understands that it will be sheer folly to annoy the Turks, who are risking their national prestige here. Turkey is a very important partner of our security establishment.
Whatever comes of it, Olmert’s agreement to conduct negotiations based on the return of all the Golan is an important step forward. Coming on top of the previous undertakings by Yitzhak Rabin, Binyamin Netanyahu and Ehud Barak, it defines a line of no return.
The second possibility: Olmert really means it. For his own reasons, he will conduct negotiations “in good faith”, as he undertook this week, and reach an agreement. In the country, a wild campaign of incitement will be launched against him. The Knesset will fall apart, new elections will be held, Olmert will again head the Kadima list and win as peacemaker.
Alternatively, he will lose those elections. But he will leave the scene in an honourable cause, not thrown out for his own corruption, but sacrificing himself on the altar of peace.
Alternatively: the Attorney General will indict him in spite of everything; he will resign but go home with head held high as a leader who has taken a historic step. The Attorney General will look like a saboteur of peace and perhaps even the cause of another war.
A pertinent question: if Olmert has indeed decided to “escape forwards”’ why escape forwards towards peace and not towards war? This is what usually happens: leaders on the threshold of disaster prefer to start a little (or sometimes big) war. There is nothing like war to divert attention, and waging war is almost always more popular, at least at the beginning, than making peace.
Here are some possibilities:
The first: like Paul, Olmert had a revelation, and has really become a man of peace. The nationalist demagogue has matured and now understands that the national interest demands peace. A cynic will laugh out loud. But stranger things have happened on the road to Damascus.
The second: Olmert believes that the Israeli public prefers peace with Syria to war with Syria, and hopes to gain some popularity as a peace-maker. (I believe this to be true.)
The third: Olmert knows that all the chiefs of the Security Establishment (with the notable exception of the Mossad boss) support peace with Syria out of cold strategic calculation. In the eyes of the army General Staff, the loss of the Golan Heights is a reasonable price to pay for breaking Syria loose from Iran and lessening its support for Hizbullah and Hamas, especially if an international force is stationed there after they revert to being the “Syrian Heights”.
Syria is a Sunni country, even if it is ruled by members of the small Alawite sect, which is closer to the Shia. The alliance between secular Sunni Syria and orthodox Shiite Iran is a marriage of convenience, without an ideological basis. The alliance with Shiite Hizbullah is also based on interests: since Syria does not dare to attack Israel in order to get the Golan back, it supports Hizbullah as a proxy.
All this happens without the US. This, too, has its precedents: the Sadat initiative of 1977 matured behind the backs of the Americans (as the American ambassador in Cairo at the time told me later). The Oslo initiative also ripened without American participation.
Until lately, the US has opposed any Israeli-Syrian thaw, and even now looks at it askance. In George Bush’s cowboy world vision, Syria belongs to the “axis of evil” and must be isolated.
That is grist to the mill for John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt, the two American professors who are due to visit Israel next month. Their provocative book asserted that the Israel lobby totally dominates US foreign policy. In this new development, it does indeed seem that Jerusalem has bent Washington to its will.
During his visit to Jerusalem a few days ago, Bush railed against talking with enemies. This was understood to be a rebuke aimed at Barack Obama, who has announced his willingness to speak with the leaders of Iran. Perhaps Olmert is already betting on Obama’s entering the White House.
But Bush is not finished yet. He has got eight more months to go, and he, too, may come to the conclusion that he should “escape forwards”. In his case: by attacking Iran.
How is all this going to affect the mother of all problems, the core of the Israeli-Arab conflict: the question of Palestine?
Menachem Begin made a separate peace with Egypt and gave back the whole of the Sinai Peninsula in order to concentrate on the war with the Palestinians. Undoubtedly, Begin was ready to do the same on the Syrian front. According to the map used by Vladimir (Ze’ev) Jabotinsky, which Olmert was brought up on, the Golan, like Sinai, is not a part of Eretz Israel.
A separate peace harbours great dangers for the Palestinians. If the Israeli government reaches a peace agreement with Syria (and then Lebanon), it will have peace with all the neighbouring states. The Palestinians will be isolated and the Israeli government will be able to deal with them as it wishes.
As against this danger, there is a positive prospect: that after the evacuation of the Golan, there will be increased pressure, from inside and outside, to reach peace with the Palestinians, too, at long last.
The international atmosphere will also change. If the “axis of evil” fantasy disappears together with George Bush, and a new American leadership makes a serious effort to achieve peace, optimism will again dare to raise its battered head. Some people dream about a partnership of Barack Obama and Tzipi Livni.
All this belongs to the future. In the meantime we have a weak Olmert, who needs a powerful initiative. In the Biblical legend, the hero Samson killed a young lion, and when he returned to it, “behold, there was a swarm of bees and honey in the carcase.” Samson put forth a riddle unto the Philistines: “Out of the strong came forth sweetness”, and nobody was able to solve it (Judges, 14). Now we can well ask: “Will the weak bring forth sweetness?”
Uri Avnery is an Israeli peace activist who has advocated the setting up of a Palestinian state alongside Israel. He served three terms in the Israeli parliament (Knesset), and is the founder of Gush Shalom (Peace Bloc)
Conventional wisdom has it that to make peace, one needs a strong leader. Now it appears that the opposite also works: that a weak leader, almost submerged in troubles, whose term in office could come to a sudden end at any moment and whose coalition stands on feet of clay — he too may risk all to make peace
THE GERMANS call it “die Flucht nach vorne” — escaping forwards. When the situation is desperate, attack! Instead of retreating, advance! When there is no way out, storm ahead!
This method was successful in 1948. At the end of May, the Egyptian army was advancing on Tel Aviv. We — a very, very thin line of soldiers — were all that stood in its way. So we attacked. Again and again and again. We suffered heavy losses. But we stopped the Egyptian advance.
Now Ehud Olmert is applying the same method. His situation is desperate. Most people in Israel do not doubt that he has received large bribes in envelopes stuffed with dollars. The Attorney General is liable to indict him any time, and this will compel him to resign.
And lo and behold, at the most critical moment, just before the most damning details come out, a joint statement is issued simultaneously in Jerusalem, Damascus and Ankara, announcing the start of peace negotiations between Israel and Syria, with Turkey acting as mediator. The talks will be based on the principles of the 1991 Madrid Conference, meaning the return of the entire Golan Heights.
In this, too, Olmert is the worthy pupil of his predecessor and mentor, Ariel Sharon.
Sharon was up to his neck in corruption affairs. In one of them, the so-called “Greek Island affair”, the Israeli millionaire David Appel paid huge sums to Sharon’s son, a novice, for “advice”. At the time, too, it seemed that the Attorney General could not possibly avoid issuing an indictment.
Sharon’s response was sheer genius: the Separation. Separation from the Gaza Strip. Separation from the Attorney General.
That was a gigantic operation. In a minutely orchestrated melodramatic performance, the Gush Katif settlements were dismantled. Together with several army divisions, all police forces — the same police that was supposed to investigate the Sharon family’s business affairs — were deployed in a breath-taking national endeavour. The peace camp supported, of course, the evacuation of the settlements. The corruption affairs were all but forgotten.
Now Ehud Olmert has to negotiate a cease-fire. For Sharon, though, the entire exercise was a success. If he had not suffered a stroke, he would still be Prime Minister today. The lesson did not escape Olmert.
Maybe my aesthetic sense is blunted. Because I am ready to accept peace even from a totally corrupt leader, even from Satan himself. If the corruption of a politician causes him to do something that will save the lives of hundreds and thousands of human beings on both sides — that’s OK with me. Didn’t the philosopher Friedrich Hegel talk about the “cunning of reason”?
The Bible recounts that when the army of Damascus laid siege to Samaria, the capital of the Kingdom of Israel, four leprous men brought the news that the enemy had fled (2 Kings, 7). The Hebrew poetess Rachel wrote, alluding to this story, that she was not willing to receive good news from lepers. Well, I am.
Conventional wisdom has it that to make peace, one needs a strong leader. Now it appears that the opposite also works: that a weak leader, almost submerged in troubles, whose term in office could come to a sudden end at any moment and whose coalition stands on feet of clay, a leader who has nothing to lose — he too may risk all to make peace.
The plot may move on from here in several possible directions.
The first possibility: it’s all “spin” — an American term that has become Olmert’s middle name. He will just stretch the negotiations out like bubble gum, as he has been doing with the Palestinians, and wait for the storm to blow over.
It will be difficult for him to do so, because Turkey is now a partner in the game. Even Olmert understands that it will be sheer folly to annoy the Turks, who are risking their national prestige here. Turkey is a very important partner of our security establishment.
Whatever comes of it, Olmert’s agreement to conduct negotiations based on the return of all the Golan is an important step forward. Coming on top of the previous undertakings by Yitzhak Rabin, Binyamin Netanyahu and Ehud Barak, it defines a line of no return.
The second possibility: Olmert really means it. For his own reasons, he will conduct negotiations “in good faith”, as he undertook this week, and reach an agreement. In the country, a wild campaign of incitement will be launched against him. The Knesset will fall apart, new elections will be held, Olmert will again head the Kadima list and win as peacemaker.
Alternatively, he will lose those elections. But he will leave the scene in an honourable cause, not thrown out for his own corruption, but sacrificing himself on the altar of peace.
Alternatively: the Attorney General will indict him in spite of everything; he will resign but go home with head held high as a leader who has taken a historic step. The Attorney General will look like a saboteur of peace and perhaps even the cause of another war.
A pertinent question: if Olmert has indeed decided to “escape forwards”’ why escape forwards towards peace and not towards war? This is what usually happens: leaders on the threshold of disaster prefer to start a little (or sometimes big) war. There is nothing like war to divert attention, and waging war is almost always more popular, at least at the beginning, than making peace.
Here are some possibilities:
The first: like Paul, Olmert had a revelation, and has really become a man of peace. The nationalist demagogue has matured and now understands that the national interest demands peace. A cynic will laugh out loud. But stranger things have happened on the road to Damascus.
The second: Olmert believes that the Israeli public prefers peace with Syria to war with Syria, and hopes to gain some popularity as a peace-maker. (I believe this to be true.)
The third: Olmert knows that all the chiefs of the Security Establishment (with the notable exception of the Mossad boss) support peace with Syria out of cold strategic calculation. In the eyes of the army General Staff, the loss of the Golan Heights is a reasonable price to pay for breaking Syria loose from Iran and lessening its support for Hizbullah and Hamas, especially if an international force is stationed there after they revert to being the “Syrian Heights”.
Syria is a Sunni country, even if it is ruled by members of the small Alawite sect, which is closer to the Shia. The alliance between secular Sunni Syria and orthodox Shiite Iran is a marriage of convenience, without an ideological basis. The alliance with Shiite Hizbullah is also based on interests: since Syria does not dare to attack Israel in order to get the Golan back, it supports Hizbullah as a proxy.
All this happens without the US. This, too, has its precedents: the Sadat initiative of 1977 matured behind the backs of the Americans (as the American ambassador in Cairo at the time told me later). The Oslo initiative also ripened without American participation.
Until lately, the US has opposed any Israeli-Syrian thaw, and even now looks at it askance. In George Bush’s cowboy world vision, Syria belongs to the “axis of evil” and must be isolated.
That is grist to the mill for John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt, the two American professors who are due to visit Israel next month. Their provocative book asserted that the Israel lobby totally dominates US foreign policy. In this new development, it does indeed seem that Jerusalem has bent Washington to its will.
During his visit to Jerusalem a few days ago, Bush railed against talking with enemies. This was understood to be a rebuke aimed at Barack Obama, who has announced his willingness to speak with the leaders of Iran. Perhaps Olmert is already betting on Obama’s entering the White House.
But Bush is not finished yet. He has got eight more months to go, and he, too, may come to the conclusion that he should “escape forwards”. In his case: by attacking Iran.
How is all this going to affect the mother of all problems, the core of the Israeli-Arab conflict: the question of Palestine?
Menachem Begin made a separate peace with Egypt and gave back the whole of the Sinai Peninsula in order to concentrate on the war with the Palestinians. Undoubtedly, Begin was ready to do the same on the Syrian front. According to the map used by Vladimir (Ze’ev) Jabotinsky, which Olmert was brought up on, the Golan, like Sinai, is not a part of Eretz Israel.
A separate peace harbours great dangers for the Palestinians. If the Israeli government reaches a peace agreement with Syria (and then Lebanon), it will have peace with all the neighbouring states. The Palestinians will be isolated and the Israeli government will be able to deal with them as it wishes.
As against this danger, there is a positive prospect: that after the evacuation of the Golan, there will be increased pressure, from inside and outside, to reach peace with the Palestinians, too, at long last.
The international atmosphere will also change. If the “axis of evil” fantasy disappears together with George Bush, and a new American leadership makes a serious effort to achieve peace, optimism will again dare to raise its battered head. Some people dream about a partnership of Barack Obama and Tzipi Livni.
All this belongs to the future. In the meantime we have a weak Olmert, who needs a powerful initiative. In the Biblical legend, the hero Samson killed a young lion, and when he returned to it, “behold, there was a swarm of bees and honey in the carcase.” Samson put forth a riddle unto the Philistines: “Out of the strong came forth sweetness”, and nobody was able to solve it (Judges, 14). Now we can well ask: “Will the weak bring forth sweetness?”
Uri Avnery is an Israeli peace activist who has advocated the setting up of a Palestinian state alongside Israel. He served three terms in the Israeli parliament (Knesset), and is the founder of Gush Shalom (Peace Bloc)
analysis: Phantom universities —Rasul Bakhsh Rais
http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2008\05\27\story_27-5-2008_pg3_2
The death of academia has serious social and economic consequences for the poor and lower middle classes, as graduates of public universities are becoming increasingly less competitive compared to graduates of better-administered private universities
Our public universities have suffered a slow and painful death, while society, the media and political parties have remained passive observers. The social and political apathy towards higher education in Pakistan has marginalised the university and our academic environment.
No government — military or civilian — paid any serious or sustained attention to the deteriorating state of universities, their internal decay; and the withering away of the academic culture, which was never robust in the first place.
The university attracted official attention only as a source of trouble — gunfights among rival students groups; strikes by teachers; and general unrest, which required heavy deployment of police, closure of universities and evacuation of student hostels.
Once a truce was arranged among warring groups of teachers or students, or once teaching commenced after tempers cooled, the university slowly trudged back to its boring routine and tense balance.
The role of the vice chancellor has been reduced to one of conflict management and of maintaining a balance among rival cliques and armed student groups supported by political parties. Whatever little time and energy he is left with is spent attending scores of meetings and fighting small brushfires that may erupt anytime. Never is there any time for developing a fresh vision, new programmes or improving the quality of teaching and research.
Throughout history, both military regimes and civilian governments hardly focused on higher education with the objective of producing world-class graduates in the natural or social sciences. Nor did they think of higher education as an opportunity to train young men and women as leaders in vital areas of national life. Our ruling elites definitely lacked the vision that modernist elites in other comparable countries had.
Those in positions of political power preferred to send their daughters and sons to foreign universities. Or, perhaps, they realised the limitations and inadequacies of higher education in Pakistan, and instead of owning this vital sector they sadly abandoned it by taking the escape route to foreign universities. This trend has increased, and it is no longer confined to the upper classes.
Only the poor and lower middle class families send their sons and daughters to the country’s public universities. Class dynamics therefore strongly reflected in the multi-patterned educational system of Pakistan. Much like the physical and social segregation of the poor and rich in urban and rural living spaces, the Pakistani educational system has become another marker of difference between individuals and families.
It is not uncommon however to see disparities and differences in the characters of universities in a country, which might range from ordinary to outstanding, but all of them have some minimum standards, and acceptance in a university is always based on individual scholastic achievement, and never entirely on one’s class background.
The indifference of successive regimes towards public universities tells only one part of the tragic story of Pakistani academia. The universities’ faculty and student organisations affiliated with political and religious parties, and their administrations, bear equal responsibility for the slow death of Pakistani academia. Let me explain how individually and collectively they have damaged public university in Pakistan.
The faculty of a university is its core element. It has tremendous capacity to determine the direction, future growth, and quality of an institutional institution. The faculty in Pakistan’s public universities, for many complex reasons, has failed to play the role of visionaries, innovators or even role models. This failure lies in their inability to rise above narrow, personalised and petty issues. Consequently, they are divided into competing groups engaged in never-ending battles.
The most distinctive thing, if any, about academia is that it is a community of scholars who are in pursuit of knowledge, and the train young minds. Sadly, the Pakistani academia has yet to transform itself to such a community. Today, it is fractured and divided community.
In my opinion, it has lost its prestige, respect and standing in the eyes of students as well as Pakistani society. The university faculty does not value the tradition of dialogue, debate, or even intellectual tolerance. This has severely damaged the atmosphere of collegiality and intellectual bonding.
It is a sad reflection on our higher education sector that a minority of students affiliated with political and religious parties have captured the large academic space in universities and has succeeded in intimidating other students, faculty members and administrations. These students have been assisted in this enterprise by likeminded faculty members, who shamelessly use them for their own purposes.
Weak political will on part of the governments, timid administrations, divided faculty, and the immoral and illegal intrusion into universities by political parties have resulted in the rise of violent student factions that have taken universities hostage.
There has been no attempt to bring in new blood or change the old administrative systems of universities. They are over-bureaucratised, marred by administrative centralisation, and headed by lethargic, inept and unmotivated personnel. The vice chancellors have absolute dependence on the incompetent and out of touch administrative machinery. The public university continues to be poorly governed, unable to lift itself up.
The death of academia has serious social and economic consequences for the poor and lower middle classes, as graduates of public universities are becoming increasingly less competitive compared to graduates of better-administered private universities.
The academia of a country reflects its collective social progress in the arts and sciences. The current state of affairs does not instil any pride or even confidence in its ability to do better without the state, society and genuine academicians taking a lead in radically transforming it.
Dr Rasul Baksh Rais is author of Recovering the Frontier State: War, Ethnicity and State in Afghanistan (Lanham, Maryland: Lexington Books 2008) and a professor of Political Science at the Lahore University of Management Sciences. He can be reached at rasul@lums.edu.pk. This article is part of a series examining the education system of Pakistan
The death of academia has serious social and economic consequences for the poor and lower middle classes, as graduates of public universities are becoming increasingly less competitive compared to graduates of better-administered private universities
Our public universities have suffered a slow and painful death, while society, the media and political parties have remained passive observers. The social and political apathy towards higher education in Pakistan has marginalised the university and our academic environment.
No government — military or civilian — paid any serious or sustained attention to the deteriorating state of universities, their internal decay; and the withering away of the academic culture, which was never robust in the first place.
The university attracted official attention only as a source of trouble — gunfights among rival students groups; strikes by teachers; and general unrest, which required heavy deployment of police, closure of universities and evacuation of student hostels.
Once a truce was arranged among warring groups of teachers or students, or once teaching commenced after tempers cooled, the university slowly trudged back to its boring routine and tense balance.
The role of the vice chancellor has been reduced to one of conflict management and of maintaining a balance among rival cliques and armed student groups supported by political parties. Whatever little time and energy he is left with is spent attending scores of meetings and fighting small brushfires that may erupt anytime. Never is there any time for developing a fresh vision, new programmes or improving the quality of teaching and research.
Throughout history, both military regimes and civilian governments hardly focused on higher education with the objective of producing world-class graduates in the natural or social sciences. Nor did they think of higher education as an opportunity to train young men and women as leaders in vital areas of national life. Our ruling elites definitely lacked the vision that modernist elites in other comparable countries had.
Those in positions of political power preferred to send their daughters and sons to foreign universities. Or, perhaps, they realised the limitations and inadequacies of higher education in Pakistan, and instead of owning this vital sector they sadly abandoned it by taking the escape route to foreign universities. This trend has increased, and it is no longer confined to the upper classes.
Only the poor and lower middle class families send their sons and daughters to the country’s public universities. Class dynamics therefore strongly reflected in the multi-patterned educational system of Pakistan. Much like the physical and social segregation of the poor and rich in urban and rural living spaces, the Pakistani educational system has become another marker of difference between individuals and families.
It is not uncommon however to see disparities and differences in the characters of universities in a country, which might range from ordinary to outstanding, but all of them have some minimum standards, and acceptance in a university is always based on individual scholastic achievement, and never entirely on one’s class background.
The indifference of successive regimes towards public universities tells only one part of the tragic story of Pakistani academia. The universities’ faculty and student organisations affiliated with political and religious parties, and their administrations, bear equal responsibility for the slow death of Pakistani academia. Let me explain how individually and collectively they have damaged public university in Pakistan.
The faculty of a university is its core element. It has tremendous capacity to determine the direction, future growth, and quality of an institutional institution. The faculty in Pakistan’s public universities, for many complex reasons, has failed to play the role of visionaries, innovators or even role models. This failure lies in their inability to rise above narrow, personalised and petty issues. Consequently, they are divided into competing groups engaged in never-ending battles.
The most distinctive thing, if any, about academia is that it is a community of scholars who are in pursuit of knowledge, and the train young minds. Sadly, the Pakistani academia has yet to transform itself to such a community. Today, it is fractured and divided community.
In my opinion, it has lost its prestige, respect and standing in the eyes of students as well as Pakistani society. The university faculty does not value the tradition of dialogue, debate, or even intellectual tolerance. This has severely damaged the atmosphere of collegiality and intellectual bonding.
It is a sad reflection on our higher education sector that a minority of students affiliated with political and religious parties have captured the large academic space in universities and has succeeded in intimidating other students, faculty members and administrations. These students have been assisted in this enterprise by likeminded faculty members, who shamelessly use them for their own purposes.
Weak political will on part of the governments, timid administrations, divided faculty, and the immoral and illegal intrusion into universities by political parties have resulted in the rise of violent student factions that have taken universities hostage.
There has been no attempt to bring in new blood or change the old administrative systems of universities. They are over-bureaucratised, marred by administrative centralisation, and headed by lethargic, inept and unmotivated personnel. The vice chancellors have absolute dependence on the incompetent and out of touch administrative machinery. The public university continues to be poorly governed, unable to lift itself up.
The death of academia has serious social and economic consequences for the poor and lower middle classes, as graduates of public universities are becoming increasingly less competitive compared to graduates of better-administered private universities.
The academia of a country reflects its collective social progress in the arts and sciences. The current state of affairs does not instil any pride or even confidence in its ability to do better without the state, society and genuine academicians taking a lead in radically transforming it.
Dr Rasul Baksh Rais is author of Recovering the Frontier State: War, Ethnicity and State in Afghanistan (Lanham, Maryland: Lexington Books 2008) and a professor of Political Science at the Lahore University of Management Sciences. He can be reached at rasul@lums.edu.pk. This article is part of a series examining the education system of Pakistan
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