Source : http://dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2011\03\31\story_31-3-2011_pg3_5
The prospect of bloody battles and massive casualties cannot be excluded. Reprisals against such an attack from terror groups would be likely. A political backlash and not merely from the Arab world as the UN Resolution 1973 precludes occupation would be severe
Wars too often are created by illusions and delusions. This is what is happening in Libya. It is an illusion to believe that if Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi clings to power, the credibility and authority of the opposing UN, Arab League, NATO, US and other states comprising the coalition will not be dealt a severe blow with accruing consequences.
But, it is a delusion to think that if the rebels do not succeed in ridding Libya of Gaddafi, there is no possibility of an outside ground assault to finish the job. The excruciating dilemma is that to limit the damage caused by the first illusion of Qaddafi holding on, reversing the delusion that no alternative exists leads to a course of action likely to prove unacceptable. Either way, the news is very bad.
As a result, we could be stuck in Libya and in a larger sense with an Arab spring that could metastasise into an Arab winter of discontent.
We have agonised over what to do about Libya. The Arab League surprisingly sought a no-fly zone over Libya to protect civilians. Despite five abstentions, the UN followed suit with UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1973 authorising “all necessary means” short of occupation to protect innocent civilians. Then NATO, in its own lurching way, pressured by the US and UK, agreed to assume command of all military operations that include sustaining a no-fly zone, air strikes to protect (and aid) the rebels and an arms embargo.
The demand that Muammar Qaddafi must go leads to an inescapable conclusion. Like it or not — and very few will like it — ground forces may be necessary to remove Qaddafi if he does not leave by other means or if the rebels fail to dislodge him. Stalemate is to Qaddafi’s advantage.
At this point, the use of outside ground forces is thinking about the unthinkable. Who would have the capacity and the stomach to supply the forces? Beyond that very tricky matter, no one has any idea of what a replacement government would look like, how that transition could be made and for how long outside countries are prepared to invest time and money to ensure stability in that oil-rich land. And, perhaps we unsuspectingly delude ourselves by calling the rebels “democratic forces”.
President Barack Obama tried to square these circles in his address Monday night. Sadly, the president had no running room. He did not wish to antagonise the Arabs and Muslims further by calling for a third US intervention into those worlds. For the moment, explicit recognition of the need to use force to expel or remove Qaddafi is something the administration will defer like the plague until it sees whether or not the rebel forces are capable of achieving that end state with minimal outside help.
The tragedy is that we and the coalition face a potential quagmire. And the options are not favourable.
First, the rebels could succeed in throwing Qaddafi out one way or another. Providing arms and air attacks could be part of this option best conducted with Arab or Muslim help from outside Libya. For a betting person, this is a Hail Mary option.
Second, a stand-off or partition of Libya with Qaddafi in control in the west and the rebels in the east could follow. Tightening Obama’s noose, Qaddafi would face a strategy of attrition and death by a thousand cuts. Significantly, he would still be in power and this could last for an extended period. This option makes hollow our threats and credibility and makes Qaddafi at least the de facto winner.
Finally, there is a Noriega option. In December 1989, President George H W Bush sent US forces into Panama to capture President Noriega. A similar operation could be mounted to end Qaddafi’s rule.
The risks are breathtaking. The prospect of bloody battles and massive casualties cannot be excluded. Reprisals against such an attack from terror groups would be likely. A political backlash and not merely from the Arab world as the UN Resolution 1973 precludes occupation would be severe. And finding the forces and willing partners to intervene may be missions impossible.
Here, illusion collides with delusion. Whether the UN, Arab League and other organisations realised it or not, a no-fly zone would ultimately lead to this juncture. To succeed, Qaddafi must go. If the rebels are unable to achieve that goal, someone else must. This is the inevitable consequence of the decision to impose a no-fly zone and the illusion it would work.
Perhaps the leaking of such plans will force Qaddafi to quit. But do not count on it. Then, if all else fails, the illusion will leave a single unpalatable and risk laden alternative — direct intervention on the ground — what some will call the ultimate delusion.
The writer is Chairman of the Killowen Group that advises leaders of government and business, and Senior Advisor at Washington DC’s Atlantic Council
ANALYSIS: Illusions and delusions of war —Harlan Ullman
The prospect of bloody battles and massive casualties cannot be excluded. Reprisals against such an attack from terror groups would be likely. A political backlash and not merely from the Arab world as the UN Resolution 1973 precludes occupation would be severeWars too often are created by illusions and delusions. This is what is happening in Libya. It is an illusion to believe that if Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi clings to power, the credibility and authority of the opposing UN, Arab League, NATO, US and other states comprising the coalition will not be dealt a severe blow with accruing consequences.
But, it is a delusion to think that if the rebels do not succeed in ridding Libya of Gaddafi, there is no possibility of an outside ground assault to finish the job. The excruciating dilemma is that to limit the damage caused by the first illusion of Qaddafi holding on, reversing the delusion that no alternative exists leads to a course of action likely to prove unacceptable. Either way, the news is very bad.
As a result, we could be stuck in Libya and in a larger sense with an Arab spring that could metastasise into an Arab winter of discontent.
We have agonised over what to do about Libya. The Arab League surprisingly sought a no-fly zone over Libya to protect civilians. Despite five abstentions, the UN followed suit with UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1973 authorising “all necessary means” short of occupation to protect innocent civilians. Then NATO, in its own lurching way, pressured by the US and UK, agreed to assume command of all military operations that include sustaining a no-fly zone, air strikes to protect (and aid) the rebels and an arms embargo.
The demand that Muammar Qaddafi must go leads to an inescapable conclusion. Like it or not — and very few will like it — ground forces may be necessary to remove Qaddafi if he does not leave by other means or if the rebels fail to dislodge him. Stalemate is to Qaddafi’s advantage.
At this point, the use of outside ground forces is thinking about the unthinkable. Who would have the capacity and the stomach to supply the forces? Beyond that very tricky matter, no one has any idea of what a replacement government would look like, how that transition could be made and for how long outside countries are prepared to invest time and money to ensure stability in that oil-rich land. And, perhaps we unsuspectingly delude ourselves by calling the rebels “democratic forces”.
President Barack Obama tried to square these circles in his address Monday night. Sadly, the president had no running room. He did not wish to antagonise the Arabs and Muslims further by calling for a third US intervention into those worlds. For the moment, explicit recognition of the need to use force to expel or remove Qaddafi is something the administration will defer like the plague until it sees whether or not the rebel forces are capable of achieving that end state with minimal outside help.
The tragedy is that we and the coalition face a potential quagmire. And the options are not favourable.
First, the rebels could succeed in throwing Qaddafi out one way or another. Providing arms and air attacks could be part of this option best conducted with Arab or Muslim help from outside Libya. For a betting person, this is a Hail Mary option.
Second, a stand-off or partition of Libya with Qaddafi in control in the west and the rebels in the east could follow. Tightening Obama’s noose, Qaddafi would face a strategy of attrition and death by a thousand cuts. Significantly, he would still be in power and this could last for an extended period. This option makes hollow our threats and credibility and makes Qaddafi at least the de facto winner.
Finally, there is a Noriega option. In December 1989, President George H W Bush sent US forces into Panama to capture President Noriega. A similar operation could be mounted to end Qaddafi’s rule.
The risks are breathtaking. The prospect of bloody battles and massive casualties cannot be excluded. Reprisals against such an attack from terror groups would be likely. A political backlash and not merely from the Arab world as the UN Resolution 1973 precludes occupation would be severe. And finding the forces and willing partners to intervene may be missions impossible.
Here, illusion collides with delusion. Whether the UN, Arab League and other organisations realised it or not, a no-fly zone would ultimately lead to this juncture. To succeed, Qaddafi must go. If the rebels are unable to achieve that goal, someone else must. This is the inevitable consequence of the decision to impose a no-fly zone and the illusion it would work.
Perhaps the leaking of such plans will force Qaddafi to quit. But do not count on it. Then, if all else fails, the illusion will leave a single unpalatable and risk laden alternative — direct intervention on the ground — what some will call the ultimate delusion.
The writer is Chairman of the Killowen Group that advises leaders of government and business, and Senior Advisor at Washington DC’s Atlantic Council
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