The ingenious inclusion of the word ‘ideological’ in the mission statement of the Pakistan armed forces was disastrously projected as the defence of the ideological frontiers of Pakistan in the times of late General Ziaul Haq. This subtle but loaded addition opened the door for the military’s customised intervention in national affairs
During rare moments of reflection, a soldier might wonder what really is the call of duty that one may one day decide to rise above. Few in the army seem to really grasp the full scope of this military phrase beyond the compass of their own interpretation, bound within the envelope of the situation they find themselves in at a given time. Broadly speaking, anything and everything within the army is inside the ambit of duty. Space beyond the call of duty is also duty despite this differentiation.
British commanders were the original authors of this notion, primarily to reward natives under their command who excelled in battles that were aplenty in those imperial times. Understandably, it was the Raj’s compulsion to encourage a band of loyal servants tested in battle to perpetuate themselves. This legacy of patronage and perpetuation, as left behind, became embedded in the psyche of basically colonial but now national armies of the subcontinent. Gradual erosion of political authority and demolition of civil institutions in Pakistan left the field open to the military to amplify and invent the sweep and the scope of its duties from purely military to civil, political and ideological endeavours as well.
Take, for example, the ingenious inclusion of the word ‘ideological’ in the mission statement of the Pakistan armed forces, which was disastrously projected as the defence of the ideological frontiers of Pakistan in the times of late General Ziaul Haq. This subtle but loaded addition opened the door for the military’s customised intervention in national affairs under this guise. Nobody paused to tell how one defines and draws an ideological frontier when ideology is a function of the mind. Resultantly, a perceptual chaos and disruption set in, conveniently wrapped under the call of duty or rather beyond the call of duty that no one really assigned.
At each level, and in almost every capacity, officers and soldiers have been confronted with this dilemma, especially those performing civil duties under military governments. Discretions and attempts to rationalise own reactions led to comic and at times pathetic situations, which were glossed over as hazards of service. These hazards of our adventures were transferred to our civil society with devastating consequences, mutilating and nearly paralysing the entire national socio-political structure. From governance to state policy, from perception to reality and from self-esteem to nationhood, everything has been terribly confounded.
Then there have been unlikely cross-breeders of this malevolence. Under the cavalier leadership of the late General Naseerullah Babar, it had to be the interior ministry that babysat and nursed the Afghan Taliban in their nascent phase — a foreign policy adventure far and absolutely beyond the pale of their responsibility. Also, it was utterly outside the compass of their duty and ability both. The result is a millstone, spindle, handle and base plate all together around Pakistan’s neck that has the weight to sink it decisively. Over-reading catchy phrases can be so unhelpful.
We have yet another case that could be an educative study in such an over-reach and, once deep into the dung pit, a typical exercise in shrugging off the onus of our military misadventure followed by an attempt at rewarding command incompetence. All this at the cost of the people of Pakistan. This refers to the Kargil disaster that so uniquely degenerated from a successful tactical action into a strategic defeat, also tying us firmly and irreversibly to international terrorism and being labelled as an irresponsible state. Our nuclear weapon state status has been left awkwardly in suspended animation ever since. No one in the otherwise naïve political leadership of the time had ever ordered to launch a full-scale military operation across the un-demarcated line of control in the Drass-Kargil sector. This was purely an ambition-driven self-generated military gamble that failed miserably, in the end pushing the region to the brink of a devastating nuclear war. The failure triggered a chain of sordid events that resulted in General Musharraf’s takeover. That is not all, it also resulted in rewarding almost every other senior officer who was directly involved in this harebrained operation with being kicked up at least two steps for their incompetence and for their ready obedience regardless of the call of duty to the country and men under their command. Pakistan has never been able to move out of that stigma ever since.
The writer is a retired brigadier of the Pakistan Army. He can be reached at clay.potter@hotmail.com
During rare moments of reflection, a soldier might wonder what really is the call of duty that one may one day decide to rise above. Few in the army seem to really grasp the full scope of this military phrase beyond the compass of their own interpretation, bound within the envelope of the situation they find themselves in at a given time. Broadly speaking, anything and everything within the army is inside the ambit of duty. Space beyond the call of duty is also duty despite this differentiation.
British commanders were the original authors of this notion, primarily to reward natives under their command who excelled in battles that were aplenty in those imperial times. Understandably, it was the Raj’s compulsion to encourage a band of loyal servants tested in battle to perpetuate themselves. This legacy of patronage and perpetuation, as left behind, became embedded in the psyche of basically colonial but now national armies of the subcontinent. Gradual erosion of political authority and demolition of civil institutions in Pakistan left the field open to the military to amplify and invent the sweep and the scope of its duties from purely military to civil, political and ideological endeavours as well.
Take, for example, the ingenious inclusion of the word ‘ideological’ in the mission statement of the Pakistan armed forces, which was disastrously projected as the defence of the ideological frontiers of Pakistan in the times of late General Ziaul Haq. This subtle but loaded addition opened the door for the military’s customised intervention in national affairs under this guise. Nobody paused to tell how one defines and draws an ideological frontier when ideology is a function of the mind. Resultantly, a perceptual chaos and disruption set in, conveniently wrapped under the call of duty or rather beyond the call of duty that no one really assigned.
At each level, and in almost every capacity, officers and soldiers have been confronted with this dilemma, especially those performing civil duties under military governments. Discretions and attempts to rationalise own reactions led to comic and at times pathetic situations, which were glossed over as hazards of service. These hazards of our adventures were transferred to our civil society with devastating consequences, mutilating and nearly paralysing the entire national socio-political structure. From governance to state policy, from perception to reality and from self-esteem to nationhood, everything has been terribly confounded.
Then there have been unlikely cross-breeders of this malevolence. Under the cavalier leadership of the late General Naseerullah Babar, it had to be the interior ministry that babysat and nursed the Afghan Taliban in their nascent phase — a foreign policy adventure far and absolutely beyond the pale of their responsibility. Also, it was utterly outside the compass of their duty and ability both. The result is a millstone, spindle, handle and base plate all together around Pakistan’s neck that has the weight to sink it decisively. Over-reading catchy phrases can be so unhelpful.
We have yet another case that could be an educative study in such an over-reach and, once deep into the dung pit, a typical exercise in shrugging off the onus of our military misadventure followed by an attempt at rewarding command incompetence. All this at the cost of the people of Pakistan. This refers to the Kargil disaster that so uniquely degenerated from a successful tactical action into a strategic defeat, also tying us firmly and irreversibly to international terrorism and being labelled as an irresponsible state. Our nuclear weapon state status has been left awkwardly in suspended animation ever since. No one in the otherwise naïve political leadership of the time had ever ordered to launch a full-scale military operation across the un-demarcated line of control in the Drass-Kargil sector. This was purely an ambition-driven self-generated military gamble that failed miserably, in the end pushing the region to the brink of a devastating nuclear war. The failure triggered a chain of sordid events that resulted in General Musharraf’s takeover. That is not all, it also resulted in rewarding almost every other senior officer who was directly involved in this harebrained operation with being kicked up at least two steps for their incompetence and for their ready obedience regardless of the call of duty to the country and men under their command. Pakistan has never been able to move out of that stigma ever since.
The writer is a retired brigadier of the Pakistan Army. He can be reached at clay.potter@hotmail.com
Source : http://dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2011\04\29\story_29-4-2011_pg3_6
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